



# EVIDENCE-INFORMED POLICY IN POST- CONFLICT CONTEXTS: NEPAL, PERU AND SERBIA

Report commissioned by the **UNDP Governance  
Centre (Oslo)**

Nicola Jones and Arnaldo Pellini<sup>1</sup>  
Research and Policy in Development Group  
Overseas Development Institute

---

<sup>1</sup> The authors wish to thank Ajoy Datta for his comments on an earlier version, Jorge Aragon, Binod Bhatta and Maja Gavrilovic, for the rich discussions we enjoyed over the process of the project about governance sector evidence-informed policy documents, and whose more in-depth research reports form the basis of this synthesis report. We also extend our thanks to the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre for their very useful insights and comments, especially Noha El-mikawy.

**Discussion Paper 17**  
Oslo Governance Centre

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This paper was written in response to several country office governance officers and national counterparts engaged in governance assessments projects requesting some clarity on the definitions of governance and its relationship to development objectives. The authors would like to thank UNDP OGC colleagues for their comments on earlier versions. ODI and UNDP OGC is also grateful for the support provided by IDRC Canada to the three country studies on which this synthesis paper is based. The preliminary findings of research in this paper were discussed in an international conference on "The role of think tanks in developing countries" that was organized by the Information and Decision Support Centre of the Prime Minister's Office in Cairo Egypt in January 2009.

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this discussion paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the United Nations, including UNDP, or UN Member States.



**United Nations  
Development Programme**

Oslo Governance Centre  
Democratic Governance Group  
Bureau for Development Policy

Borggata 2B, Postboks 2881 Tøyen  
0608 Oslo, Norway

Phone +47 23 06 08 20  
Fax +47 23 06 08 21  
[oslogovcentre@undp.org](mailto:oslogovcentre@undp.org)  
[www.undp.org/oslocentre](http://www.undp.org/oslocentre)

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade, the importance of grounding efforts to promote human development and human security in empirically-based research, has become increasingly visible, particularly in developed country contexts such as the United Kingdom but also increasingly in developing country contexts (e.g. Court et al., 2005). Surprisingly, however, there has been little discussion about evidence-informed policy and programming in fragile states despite increasing attention to governance challenges by the international community since the launch of the so-called “War on Terror”. As Collier (2007: 3) has emphasized, the challenge we face lies not in an expansive focus on the five billion individuals in developing countries, but on the bottom billion who reside in countries that are ‘falling behind, and often falling apart’. In the same vein, approximately two thirds of the 34 countries most off-track in terms of achieving the Millennium Development Goals of poverty reduction, human capital development, gender equality, environmental sustainability and the provision of decent work for all can be characterized as fragile, conflict or recent post-conflict contexts (DFID, 2009).

There is a pressing need to promote greater understanding of the intersection between governance practices and developmental outcomes. In order to contribute to meeting this need, this paper summarizes case studies from three diverse post-conflict contexts on the production and use of governance evidence at both the general and sectoral levels.<sup>2</sup> Governance evidence is defined as systematic knowledge about governance challenges and the effectiveness of governance policies in addressing them. While the country case studies are published separately, this summary paper synthesizes the key country experiences. It begins by providing a brief overview of the specific social, economic and political contexts for each country as well as a very short history of each country’s respective conflict(s). It then turns in section two to an analysis of dynamics of the production, communication and uptake of governance evidence in the post-conflict period in each country. We draw on the RAPID framework, which emphasises that an understanding of the knowledge-policy interface needs to consider the political context, the quality and packaging of evidence, and linkages between knowledge and policy actors.<sup>3</sup> These dynamics are considered at a general level and are then explored in more depth using a social sector case study (either education or social protection).<sup>4</sup> Section three is a comparative discussion of these dynamics using an analytical framework on sector-specific evidence-informed policy processes presented in the companion literature review paper (see Jones et al., 2009). Finally in section four, the paper offers suggestions for further research in the area of research-informed evidence and governance policy development in post-conflict countries.

### 1.1. Research Questions and Methodology

The three case studies examined the following questions:

- What are existing efforts to generate evidence on governance at the national and sub-national levels, including any nationally derived governance assessments that may have taken place in the past few years?
- What tools are used by state and non- state entities such as research institutes, think tanks and NGOs to assess governance practices (e.g. tools assessing corruption, public administration, decentralization)? that?
- To what extent has governance evidence been used to shape governance principles and practices at the sectoral level?

---

<sup>2</sup> The Nepal, Peru and Serbia case studies were selected in agreement with the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre (OGC) and were supervised by ODI to inform an UNDP-led Round Table Discussion “Evidence on Governance into Policy” Initiative project that culminated in a workshop in Cairo in January 2009. The project also includes case studies from Palestine and Sudan that have been supervised directly by the OGC.

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix 1 for a diagrammatic representation of this framework.

<sup>4</sup> See Appendix 2 for a summary table of similarities and differences of these three cases along the three key dimensions of the RAPID context-evidence-linkages framework.

- What types of supply and demand constraints shape evidence production and uptake in policy processes?


Given the rising role of think tanks and research institutes as key players in the generation of evidence on governance policies and practices, what particular opportunities and challenges do they face in a post-conflict context.

The methodology employed involved a literature review of government documents as well as programme and project reports, complemented by interviews with key informants. The latter were carried out by local research partners in the local language(s) and included semi-structured interviews with government agencies and ministries, donor agencies, research institutes and other civil society organizations. For more detail, please see the three companion country case study reports.<sup>5</sup> Together the desktop review and interview data provide an up-to-date perspective on the challenges involved in promoting the communication and use of research-based evidence in governance policy processes in post-conflict contexts.

## 1.2. Background Context: Human and Economic Development

Nepal, Peru, and Serbia all differ considerably in terms of both economic and human development. Nepal is classified as a least developed country with \$1,000 GDP per capita.(PPP US\$).<sup>6</sup> Peru and Serbia are both middle income countries with \$10,911 and \$7,600 GDP per capita (PPP US\$), respectively. Human Development Index data are not available for Serbia over time. Figure 1 shows that Nepal and Peru are far apart in terms of Human Development Index (HDI) progress. Both countries have shown improvements in the aggregate index during the period 1975-2005, but Nepal is still struggling with low levels in human development and ranks 142<sup>nd</sup> (out of 177 countries) while Peru is ranked 87<sup>th</sup> (UNDP 2007). In 2006, Serbia ranked 65<sup>th</sup> (out of 179 countries)

Figure 1




Source: UNDP 2007

Life expectancy is only slightly different between Serbia (73.7 years) and Peru (70.6 years), while rates in Nepal with 62.6 years are far lower (ibid.). Infant mortality below five years of age shows a greater difference between Serbia and Peru, while Nepal lags behind (Figure 2)

<sup>5</sup> See Bhatta, 2009; Gavrilovic, 2009; Aragon and Vegas, 2009.

<sup>6</sup> PPP is purchasing power parity in United States dollars.


Figure 2



Source: UNDP 2007 and World Bank 2008

Building effective government institutions is easier when the population is literate and educated (Rondinelli and Cheema, 2007). Literacy rates among adult populations (i.e. above 15 years of age) differ considerably in the three countries, and show an alarming gap between Nepal and Peru.

Figure 3



Source: UNDP 2008 and World Bank 2008

What these countries have in common is that they have all merged from conflicts. Officially, these conflicts ended at different points over the last decade, yet they are still not fully solved and continue to influence political and governance reforms and peace building processes.

### 1.3. Conflict Histories

The conflict trajectories in the three country cases are outlined in this section. It is important to note that in some respects the three cases are dealing with similar governance challenges despite disparate levels of economic and human development. They are all engaged in transitional justice issues, public administration reform, decentralization and rebuilding trust between citizens and the state, including through initiatives to improve service access and enhance economic stability. While these similarities are significant, section 1.2 has identified major differences in the levels of economic and human development in the three countries. Development levels intersect powerfully with governance reform opportunities and challenges, which results in important differences in the three post-conflict contexts. In the case of Nepal, for instance, many citizens have never had the opportunity to participate in policy processes, as highlighted by a recent participatory governance assessment funded by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) (see Jones et al., 2009). In Peru and Serbia, while this is the case for certain minority populations (e.g. indigenous populations in isolated Andean or jungle areas in Peru or the Roma population in Serbia), the focus is more about restoring and expanding participatory channels (e.g. Levitsky, 1999). Likewise, Nepal's debate about govern-

ance at the social sector level tends to focus on issues of access (DFID and the World Bank, 2006) and in the other two cases the emphasis is on concerns about service quality.

### 1.3.1 Nepal

Nepal emerged in late 2006 from a civil conflict declared by a Maoist insurgency a decade earlier. It is the most recent transition case of the three countries under study. Lengthy negotiations on the post-conflict democratization process ensued in 2007 and 2008, resulting eventually in the overthrow of the King and an end to Nepal's status as a constitutional monarchy. In 2008 Nepali citizens elected a new Constituent Assembly, which is now led by the Communist (i.e. Maoist) party. Tensions remain and the transition towards peace and the re-establishment of a governance system and related processes has been complex and uneven at both the national and sub-national levels. Ongoing political tensions present a challenge at the national level, especially in the southern Terai region where tensions have resulted in some unresolved killings. At the sub-national level, the challenge is developing and promoting adequate channels for participation among the citizenry, which aims to overcome distrust and distance from the state and to provide opportunities for input into the reform process.

As case studies, Peru and Serbia provide an interesting contrast to Nepal because both underwent transitions to democracy around 2000, but eight years later face very different governance conditions. The situations in Peru and Serbia highlight the importance of paying attention to the sequencing of reforms. As case studies, they also highlight the relative emphasis that transitional societies can place on different aspects of governance, from the more technocratic aspects of public finance and public administration reforms to the more political dimensions of human rights grievances and participatory planning and budgetary mechanisms. Both cases also underscore the diverse dynamics and various actor constellations involved in the production of evidence on governance reforms as well as its uptake into policy processes.

### 1.3.2 Peru

Armed conflict in Peru between the national army and the Shining Path's Maoist rebels largely ceased in the mid-1990s, while conflict between the authoritarian regime and the citizenry carried on for several more years and only effectively ended in 2000. In September of that year, President Alberto Fujimori, elected non-constitutionally for a third term, fled the country when the network of political corruption created during his regime was first coming to light. A transitional government presided over by Valentín Paniagua was established with assurances of elections in order to establish a new government and congress by July 2001. Alejandro Toledo, one of the leaders of the opposition to the regime of Alberto Fujimori was elected president. However, despite early public enthusiasm, his presidency ended with exceedingly low popularity ratings due in large part to failings on the governance front. The national election held in 2006 involved a tense run-up between two centre-left candidates: Alan Garcia, a former president who had overseen a disastrous economic downturn in the 1970s; and Ollanta Humala, a left-leaning nationalist with a long military career. Garcia won in part because voters feared Humala's close connections with Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez. This election, which entailed the peaceful hand-over of power to an opposition party, defined a clear break with the Fujimori era. Tensions remain, however, in some parts of the country. The Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*), which had led an insurgency during the 1980s and early 1990s, has declined significantly in terms of numbers (from 10,000 at its height to an estimated 400 to 500 rebels), especially since the life sentence given to rebel leader Abimail Guzman in 2006. Nevertheless, the threat of violence in some parts of rural Peru, especially in Amazonas, has not completely disappeared.

### 1.3.3 Serbia

Following the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991, Serbia and Montenegro formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1992. Rising nationalist and independence aspirations resulted in bloody conflict between Croats and Bosnian Muslims. The United Nations imposed sanctions on FRY, contributing to the end of the Bosnian war in 1995. Serbian Slobadan Milosevic, became president in 1997 and in 1998 the Kosovo Liberation Army rebelled against Serbian rule. Milosevic's government responded with a brutal crackdown and in 1999 NATO launched air

strikes against Serbian targets. Milosevic agreed to withdraw forces from Kosovo, which became a United Nations protectorate but remained de jure part of Serbia. However, in 2000, Milosevic was accused of rigging the presidential elections, and following mass street demonstrations and the storming of parliament by protesters, Milosevic resigned from office and Vojislav Kostunica was sworn in as president. The following year Milosevic was extradited to the Hague War Crimes Tribunal. In 2003, Yugoslavia became the Confederation of Serbia and Montenegro. In 2006, Montenegro declared independence and Serbia's borders took their present shape. Two non-Serb provinces are still part of Serbia: Vojvodina and Kosovo. Kosovo, under United Nations administration since 1999, is also moving towards independence.

## 2. COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

Having provided a brief overview of the political, socio-economic and historic contexts of the conflicts that have recently afflicted Nepal, Peru and Serbia, the paper now turns to an analysis of the dynamics of evidence production, translation and uptake in these three post-conflict countries. The discussion is shaped around the three key components of the RAPID knowledge-policy interface framework: (1) political context; (2) the quality and packaging of evidence; (3) linkages between knowledge and policy actors.

### 2.1. Nepal: A Recent Post-conflict Case <sup>7</sup>

The case of Nepal provides the perspective of a country that has just ended a 10-year civil war. This war started in February 1996 and spread to 63 out of the 75 districts of the country. A fragile peace has now returned to the country, where Constituent Assembly elections were held in April 2008. The elections gave the Communist Party of Nepal (the party of the former Maoist rebels) the largest number of seats in the Assembly. The interim government is in the



early stages of the transition from a constitutional monarchy to a republic as well as from a Hindu Kingdom to a secular republic. Reforms of government institutions and governance processes, particularly at the sub-national level, have been revived through a renewed impetus to pursue processes of decentralization and devolution. While citizens and community members emphasize the importance of sustainable peace, political tension is hampering the reform process and, for example, delaying the drafting of the new constitution (expected by June 2010).<sup>8</sup> The case of Nepal is interesting in that it shows how the highly diverse and complex experiences during the insurgency have undermined trust towards the state. What role is research-based evidence playing in rebuilding mechanisms of trust and accountability between citizens and government institutions? This is an important question to investigate since one of the main objectives of governance reform is to rebuild institutional social capital.

#### 2.1.1 Political Context

Nepal was under the autocratic rule of Rana Prime Ministers (the king used to be little more than a figurehead) for 104 years until 1950. It was a country closed to the outside world except for a close relationship with the British Government. Their autocratic rule was overthrown by popular uprising and King Tribhuvan assumed the power. In his historical proclamation on 18 February 1951, King Tribhuvan declared that government of the Nepali people would be carried

<sup>7</sup> This section is extracted from Binod Bhatta, 2008.

<sup>8</sup> As mentioned by the Economist (War Without Bloodshed, Economist March 28th 2009), the Maoist led coalition won a stunning election in April 2008 and faced three giant tasks: to promote better Government in one of the poorest countries in South Asia; to help sustain a peace process that followed a bitter, decade-long struggle; and to preside over the writing of a new constitution. Writing the new constitution will probably be the most difficult task and little progress has been achieved due to fundamental disagreement and political jockeying.

out according to a democratic constitution prepared by a constituent assembly elected by the people. A decade passed in political turmoil and the democratic constitution did not materialize. After a short period with a democratically elected government between 1959 and 1960, King Mahendra, Tribhuvan's successor, dissolved the elected parliament, arrested Prime Minister B. P. Koirala along with leaders of his party on 15 December 1960, and took over full control of the country. This takeover led to three decades of direct rule by the monarchy under the name of the *Panchayat* system. All political parties were banned and the King had absolute power.

Citizens' rights were largely curtailed under the Panchayat system. The autocratic system supported limited transparency and limited participation. People had extremely limited opportunities to publicly voice their concerns until the referendum of 1980, which opened some space for popular participation. This situation contributed to poor governance and rampant corruption. In 1990, popular protests led by the banned political parties forced the King to do away with the *Panchayat* system and change the constitution in 1990 to become a constitutional monarchy with an elected government.

During the 1990s tension continued as people realized that expectations about governments that they had democratically elected between 1991 and 2002 did not improve well-being or reduce acute regional disparities.<sup>9</sup> In the meantime, the Maoist insurgency started on 13 February 1996 and lasted for a decade, claiming the lives of more than 13,000 people.

The insurgency began as a political movement with a firm political ideology and gained, at least initially, popular support because of certain socio-economic conditions experienced by Nepalese citizens (e.g. geographical isolation or remoteness and social exclusion) and governance failures (e.g. lack of basic public services delivery, corruption, political infighting). However, the insurgency and resulting warfare caused significant damage to the fragile Nepali economy. Infrastructure was destroyed, long and frequent strikes disrupted economic activities, international tourism (a main source of income for the country) dropped dramatically, and international donor agencies suspended development programmes and projects. In addition, the livelihoods of millions of people, particularly in rural areas, were disrupted by killings, extortion, confiscation of assets, and forced recruitment. This resulted in displacement or migration, a decrease in agricultural production, and a decline in living standards.

A 2007 governance assessment for Nepal conducted by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and Nepal Participatory Action Network (NEPAN) for DFID in 21 communities spanning 10 districts of the country found that communities in different parts of the country suffered highly diverse and complex experiences during the insurgency, although the following common experiences emerged:

- fear and violence (physical, psychological or sexual);
- disruption to daily life through frequent occupation by Maoists and/or Nepali Army;
- disruption to schools and development programmes;
- separated families;
- sense of neglect of older generation.

All 21 communities emphasized that they had experienced improved life quality since the peace process, and the importance of achieving sustainable peace. Rural communities, however, seem to be more optimistic than urban for the potential for positive change during the post-conflict

---

<sup>9</sup> The last parliamentary election that took place in Nepal was in 1999. On the day of the Royal Massacre, 1 June 2001, the elected government led by Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala of the Nepali Congress Party was in power. The Prime Minister resigned in July 2001 following the Royal Massacre and due to heavy criticism on his handling of the dramatically escalating situation. Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba, also from the Nepali Congress Party, succeeded as Prime Minister and dissolved the Parliament, calling for new elections in May 2002 that did not take place. In October 2002, King Gyanendra dismissed Prime Minister Deuba with the charge that he could not hold the parliamentary election and appointed three Prime Ministers (including Deuba again) for three short periods of time, before the King himself monopolized power. Popular protests and demonstrations marked these decisions by the King. As a result of this political turmoil, Nepal did not have an elected government until the recent Constituent Assembly, which was elected by the people and is led by the Maoist party.

peace process. Moreover, concerns about the risks of political fragmentation and communal violence remain particularly strong in the Terai region, where ethnic tensions remain high.

### 2.1.2 Governance Agenda Foci

The post conflict transition in Nepal is complex and fragile, yet there is urgency and an opportunity that should not be missed. Community members have shown a high level of enthusiasm to participate in the democratization process and to make it succeed (ODI and NEPAN 2007). There is demand for greater access to information on the democratization process and to better understand the role and significance of the Constituent Assembly (ibid).

It is very important for the Constituent Assembly to respond to this demand for information and transparency in order to capitalize on this enthusiasm and to secure the popular support required for reforms to succeed.

The government's three-year interim plan (2007/08-2009/10)<sup>10</sup> states that the concept of good governance covers the whole spectrum of services provided by the public administration, communities, non-government social organizations, the private sector and all other sectors. The assumption is that if public administration could be operated according to the concept of good governance, other sectors would be influenced by this as well. To achieve this result, it will be important to introduce reforms that are inclusive and to introduce administration mechanisms and processes that support accountability, participation, provision of basic services and the strengthening of the rule of law. The main strategy of the Constituent Assembly is to move towards greater devolution in the direction of a federal state with greater autonomy at the sub-national level.

### 2.1.3 Evidence on Governance

Awareness of the importance of an evidence-informed policy development process is very limited among policy makers and donor agencies in Nepal. The long history of autocratic governments and governance with extremely limited democratic participation account for this situation. The country is now in an early post-conflict stage when the capacity for producing sound research must be rebuilt. Even in the pre-conflict period, a study by Bhatta (2009) found only a couple of cases where research institutes were involved in the policy process, although more in terms of the generation of data rather than actively influencing policy through research.

#### **Box 1: Knowledge generation dynamics and challenges in Nepal**

New Era, a non-profit research organization, for example, has been conducting Demographic and Health Surveys in Nepal at five-year intervals (e.g. 1996, 2001, 2006). The 1996 survey reported that the maternal mortality rate was 539 deaths in every 100,000 births, which was probably the highest in the South Asian region. Based on this finding, the Ministry of Health developed policy and strategies to curb this high rate. It initiated the Safer Motherhood Project, launched large-scale awareness campaigns, and provided incentives to mothers and health workers when they reached health centres for childbirth. The 2006 survey showed a considerable drop in the maternal mortality rate from 539 to 281 deaths in every 100,000 births. The Research Centre for Educational Innovation and Development (CERID) has been conducting research for the Ministry of Education in Nepal over the past few years. However, the results and evidence usually have found very limited use in policy processes. One exception was research in cooperation with the Ministry of Education, where the evidence has been used in designing the School Sector Reform programme (SSR).

Most research institutions act as consultancies and are not in the position to conduct their research independently due to the nature of external financial support they rely upon (Bhatta, 2009). If think tanks are defined by their ability to undertake independent research, Bhatta argues that it is possible to conclude that there are very few think tanks in Nepal. While there is an academic research tradition in the country, policy-oriented research has been a neglected area in Nepal. Possible exceptions include two Nepali advocacy forums, NEPAN and Martin Chautari, which were set up to share experiences and lessons learned on various development issues. There also are government research institutes such as the National Planning Commission (NPC), which conducts macro-level studies for policy formulation as well as its own re-

<sup>10</sup> The Nepali fiscal year covers the period 16th July to 15th July the following year.

search projects. However, Bhatta (2009) concludes that the main weakness of the NPC is that research appointments may be done along political party lines, which can undermine the commitment of existing researchers. Moreover, Bhatta notes that in general the government has limited cooperation or exchange with existing research institutes.

The conclusion that policy makers and donor agencies in Nepal show very limited awareness of the importance of an evidence-informed policy development process is confirmed by an assessment conducted by DFID in 2004.<sup>11</sup> The study found that in Nepal there is no client base to use the results from think tanks; it recognized that although there are many highly competent and qualified persons in the country, there is hardly any established independent credible institution to be looked upon as a think tank.

### 2.1.4 Linkages that Facilitate Dissemination and Uptake of Governance Evidence

The research for this case study suggests in Nepal there is no precedent for building solid knowledge-based institutions and evidence-informed policy processes. As there are few incentives, there is limited investment. Only the few individuals who have become expert in a subject area and consultants who write reports based on specific terms of reference achieve—and even then only rarely—an in-depth level of analysis. In addition, there does not seem to be a public space or a civil society space where thinkers or think-tanks from the private sector could also contribute.

International donors have some responsibility for this state of affairs as they have not provided sufficient support for the establishment of think tanks, despite an explicit demand for more evidence-informed policy debates. But this would necessitate funding and capacity building that goes beyond a consultancy mode of research. As shown earlier, in the absence of incentives for setting up think tank-type research institutes, a few individuals have created consultancy-type research institutes in the form of private companies and NGOs; but because of vested interests they have not criticized the activities of their clients.

The main challenge in the Nepali context is to get support for the role think tanks can and should play, Bhatta says. In the two years since the end of the conflict, however, the government has had to confront challenging situations such as the electricity power crisis, agitation by various groups and factions, differences of opinion and conflict within the Maoist Party and the demanding task of managing a coalition government. Some may therefore argue that this may not be the right time to develop stronger research capacity and channels to inform policy as it is simply too early to have such expectations of the government. On the other hand, the Government is faced with overwhelming challenges for which clear empirical analysis could be very helpful in informing policy decisions and increasing public trust in the state. Whether or not legislators and government officials have the necessary research 'consumption' skills to absorb and use the findings of think tank research is of course another question.

### 2.1.5 Sectoral Level Dynamics

Two examples of research playing an influential role in governance come from the education sector; they are among the very few such examples identified by Bhatta.

The education sector continues to follow the Education Act of 1971 and its amendments, which suggests it is not progressive in terms of governance. Before the nationalization of schools they were managed with a certain degree of transparency and community involvement. Although the 1971 National Education System Plan (NESP) ensured a regular budget to schools with salaries for teachers, the plan also reduced opportunities for community members to be involved in school management; as a result, the sense of ownership and participation by community members was lost.

The main lesson from the NESP was that the government alone could not manage the entire education system. By 1980 the system slowly reverted to its previous form, although the curriculum remained the same. Private schools were allowed and grew very rapidly in number and

---

<sup>11</sup> Interview with Mr Hira Mani Ghimire, Governance Advisor to DFID Nepal who was hired to conduct the study.

with limited regulations. In 1991, after restoration of a multi-party democracy system in the country, a national education commission was formed. The Commission submitted its report in 1992 but, unfortunately, its recommendations were never implemented. The case of the national education commission is an example of the limited use or influence that research-based evidence has had in the governance of the education sector in Nepal.

In 2001, the World Bank carried out a study, "Nepal Priorities and Strategies for Education Reform,"<sup>12</sup> that became one of the major factors in bringing back communities into the management of schools. As a leading donor in the education sector, the World Bank urged the government to hasten the policy process on school management reform. Subsequently, the Ministry of Education commissioned a series of research studies related to its Education For All policy. The studies were conducted by the Centre for Educational Innovation and Development (CERID) and the Tribhuvan University with technical assistance provided by Norway's Ministry of Education and Research. They produced 21 studies over a period of three years, from 2005 to 2007. The findings from which have been used by the Ministry of Education in designing the School Sector Reform (SSR) programme. Along with research by the national education commission that was never used, these studies represent the very limited activity at the sectoral level regarding production and uptake of reliable knowledge to influence policy decisions.

## 2.2. Serbia: A Case of Prolonged Democratic Transition

### 2.2.1 Political Context

Since 2000, Serbia has undergone major political and economic changes that include establishing peace, reinstating parliamentary democracy and reintegrating into the world community. Yet Serbia is still a country in transition from a socialist, centralized society with glaring and persisting governance challenges, including unresolved tensions with Kosovo. Some argue (e.g. Milivojevic 2007) that weak governance is the main factor why Serbia is lagging behind other transition countries in the broader reform process. Governance factors that are hindering implementation of ongoing reforms include:



- the unstable and polarized political arena, including an unstable parliamentary majority and a multiplicity of political parties;
- the still-strong legacy of centralization and uneven municipality development;
- low public administration capacity;
- an inadequate judicial system;
- high levels of corruption which pervade all levels of government (Begovic 2007).

These factors are mirrored in the views and perceptions of the Serbian community which, while overall remaining committed to democratic values, is increasingly disappointed and losing trust in public institutions. According to the UNDP 2004 Aspirations Survey, beyond formal party politics, there is a low level of interest or willingness of individuals to engage in public activities, including interest group organizations, trade unions and NGOs of any type. As such, the new Serbian government is facing a pressing need to improve governance and make key institutions more inclusive, transparent, accountable and predictable.

### 2.2.2 Governance Agenda Foci

In Serbia to date, the governance agenda has been strongly shaped by the reform roadmap for achieving integration into the European Community. In this sense, the agenda has been exter-

<sup>12</sup> Report No. 22065NEP, The World Bank, 2001.

nally driven. While there has been strong buy-in from some segments of the population, this sentiment is not universal. Key elements of this agenda include economic reforms, social accountability, the fight against crime and corruption, observance of international law, strengthening the legislature's oversight capabilities, modernizing and depoliticizing the public service, judicial reforms and comprehensive decentralization.

Decentralization and promoting greater citizen involvement in the planning and oversight of basic service delivery at the community level are important priorities. Although there have been considerable advances, major challenges remain: limited local authority capacity (especially in small rural municipalities), weak strategic planning processes, the under-development of civic organizations that could exploit new opportunities to participate in policy consultation processes, and limited transparency and accountability mechanisms at the sub-national level.

Corruption is also a critical area. According to a recent survey by the Center for Liberal and Democratic Studies (2007), "corruption is still a wide-spread and dangerous phenomenon in Serbia". It is undermining confidence in democratic institutions and processes and jeopardizing the legitimacy of decision makers to perform necessary reforms (Transparency Serbia 2005). Although the government has pledged to intensify its efforts, a 2008 assessment by the European Commission (EC) was pessimistic about the extent to which this commitment is being fulfilled in practice.

Interestingly, the Serbian governance agenda has focused considerably less on post-conflict issues such as human rights and the establishment of a truth and reconciliation committee, found in comparable transitional societies such as those in South Africa and Latin America. This could be due in part to the territorial splintering of the former Yugoslavia and the fact that conflicting communities (except for Kosovo) now reside in separate sovereign territories. However, other reasons include the persistent weakness of the justice system, and concerns about the independence of judicial personnel (EC Report, 2008). The Belgrade Centre for Human Rights offers numerous reasons for judicial weakness, including lack of technical conditions to implement various laws related to the court system; judges who live in constant fear and uncertainty about the next election (given their dependence on the parliament); and low human resource capacity, especially with regard to international standards and conventions.

### 2.2.3 Evidence on Governance

An evidence-informed political culture in Serbia is still in its early stages, and this is particularly the case in the area of governance. There is no national-level monitoring system to track the progress of governance reforms, and instead the initiatives that do exist are highly fragmented and tend to be driven by donor-funded projects and programmes. As such, most of the accessible written evidence on governance initiatives is produced by international agencies such as the World Bank, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the EC. Nevertheless, some important nationally-driven governance evidence initiatives do exist.<sup>13</sup> Four examples are provided below:

First, the national PRSP<sup>14</sup> implementation monitoring process has involved a range of stakeholders in the design of indicators and ongoing discussion of results. The PRSP coordination committee is aware of the importance of evidence-informed policy-making and is spearheading a cross-government initiative to promote greater coordination among data collection and reporting agencies (interview, 2008).

Second, there has been keen civil society and donor interest to monitor progress in decentralization, given its importance as a counterweight to the excessive centralization experiences during the administrations of Tito and Milosevic. An important knowledge generation project is the USAID-funded Good Governance Matrix pilot project implemented by the local NGO, CeSID, Transparency International and the American Bar Association. The project is measuring indicators for citizen rights, the level of public trust in local government institutions, the quality of

---

<sup>13</sup> Although there is now a general recognition that PRSPs are closely linked to donor conditionalities, our key informants nevertheless argued that there had been a significant degree of national level buy-in to the process.

<sup>14</sup> Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP)

## EVIDENCE-INFORMED POLICY IN POST-CONFLICT CONTEXTS

work undertaken by locally elected councils, and the utility of Citizens' Forums to hold local governments to account for their service delivery mandates. In addition, the project uses self-assessments by local governments of the Code of Ethics. This exercise has entailed the collection of both quantitative data from the Bureau of Statistics and qualitative data about perception survey, peer reviewing, local report cards).

Third, there has been considerable interest in measuring progress in anti-corruption measures, and multi-stakeholder partnerships have been created among civil society, media, the community and select government agencies. Generic methods and home-grown tools for measuring corruption have been utilized, including (1) the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, (2) more in-depth research on various dimensions of corruption (politics and corruption, public perceptions, media and corruption, etc.) by the local think tank, the Center for Liberal and Democratic Studies, and (3) Transparency's monitoring of Parliament's record in overseeing the 2005 National Anti-corruption Strategy.

Fourth, in the judicial and human rights sector, the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights is one of the few NGOs that has been systematically monitoring, assessing and reporting on progress in reforms in this area. Their work has largely entailed comparing existing Serbian laws with international standards, and detailing areas where the local legal framework needs to be reformed in order to comply with Serbia's international commitments. This work is reliant on official data sources, but the Centre tries to identify areas of inaccuracy and to work with local authorities to amend these wherever possible (interview, 2008).

### 2.2.4 Linkages That Facilitate Dissemination and Uptake of Governance Evidence

Research for this case study suggests that few actors in Serbia involved in evidence generation on governance reforms have a good overview of the range of initiatives that are being undertaken in this area, and that knowledge-sharing and knowledge-management mechanisms are acutely lacking. Nevertheless, actors involved in generating governance evidence are engaged in a range of dissemination activities as outlined in Box 1, although evaluations of these have not been undertaken.

#### Box 2: Examples of activities to disseminate governance evidence in Serbia

**CeSID/USAID Good Governance Matrix:** Brochures and pamphlets with summary findings have been printed and discussed in educative panels. The methodology has also been developed into a manual for monitoring, which in turn has been widely disseminated to local government actors, media and the broader community. There is a high degree of transparency in terms of disclosing governance evidence related to CSO monitoring efforts, yet key informants noted that there is a lower level of transparency in monitoring the implementation of the ethical code of conduct, as the government usually takes full control of the assessment process. [[SPELL OUT CSO on first reference]] This is particularly troublesome in municipalities where non-state actors have weak watchdog capacities, unable to demand relevant information and results.

**Transparency Serbia's Corruption Perception Index:** Both state and non-state actors use this tool to influence decisions about governance reforms. Serbian Minister of Justice Snezana Malovic recently called attention to the latest CPI results, saying "Serbia should be concerned since its rank in this year's Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is extremely low compared to other countries in the region, including the former Yugoslav republics." According to Transparency Serbia (2008), the Index is a popular tool: "The CPI is one of the most eminent and quoted country rankings regarding perceptions about widespread corruption, and shapes not only the activities of government and NGO actors, but also those of investors who do business with countries where the risk of corruption is lower." A press conference is regularly organized by Transparency Serbia to communicate the findings and specific policy recommendations, and to advocate for more effective government action to curb corruption.

**Monitoring Parliament's efforts to oversee National Anti-Corruption Strategy:** Press releases are another increasingly common communication tool in the field of govern-

ance evidence. For example, Transparency Serbia recently issued a press release warning the public that the implementation of the Law on Anticorruption Agency is endangered before it even comes into effect on 1 January 2010. The Law should resolve urgent issues by ensuring independent control of political parties' financial assets and by checking the accuracy of data stated in officials' property reports; however, it contains insufficiently clear norms and is thus feared by NGOs to be of limited utility. Source: Gavrilovic, 2008

### 2.2.5 Sectoral Level Dynamics

Some of the challenges faced in embedding evidence-informed policy processes in transitional polities are illuminated by an analysis of the ways in which governance reforms are monitored through the generation and uptake of governance evidence in the social protection sector. Such analysis also highlights some of the real opportunities that exist to work towards a more sustainable and equitable peace in Serbia.

As discussed above, conflict had a devastating impact on the socio-economic situation in Serbia. GDP declined dramatically in the 1990s, caused by the deep economic, social and political crisis in the country; this plunged many people into poverty as a result of high unemployment and a dramatic decrease in real wages and social benefits. At the same time, an influx of nearly 700,000 displaced persons and refugees exponentially increased the number of citizens eligible for social assistance. Efforts to fight against poverty and to improve the social protection of vulnerable groups became main aims of the new post-conflict government's programme of reforms in the early 2000s. To do this, however, the government would need to overcome a severe shortage of funds, repay debts to citizens for overdue welfare entitlements, and deal with deteriorated institutional capacities to deliver necessary basic and social services.

The case of social protection is revealing because of the range of actors involved—governmental, international, NGO and think tank—and the extent to which social protection is in many ways perceived as a test case for strengthening an important dimension of governance: state-citizen cooperation in the processes of decision-making and implementation for the delivery of services (interview, 2008).

Research on social exclusion, risk and vulnerability has been limited in Serbia, and the previous regime did not support such research. However, since 2001 interest in research has increased in academic, NGO and government circles. This increase is seen in a proliferation of studies focusing on poverty, inequality and social transfers (Bogićević et. al., 2002, 2003); poverty of different vulnerable groups such as the Roma (Bjeloglav et. al., 2007; UNDP, 2006); refugees, displaced persons (Cvejić and Babović, 2008); and the gendered dimensions of poverty and social exclusion, including family violence and abuse.

A more systematic approach to research is also gaining increasing attention among state authorities. The National Institute for Social Protection was established as part of the overall intention to promote evidence-informed policy-making. The Institute's ambitious mandate is to strengthen research and professional capacities in the country necessary for the improvement of the social welfare system, starting with clear baseline data. The Institute tenders out research projects and developing partnerships with government and NGO actors to produce policy relevant research. To support this area of work, NGO Focal Points for the implementation of the PRSP have been charged with facilitating the inclusion of research findings from civil society groups into policy design, programme implementation, monitoring and reporting. The programme consists of seven NGO Focal Points relating to vulnerable groups of population in line with the PRS recommendations: women, youth, refugees and IDPs, children, Roma, elderly, people with disabilities. This mechanism has been complemented by the development of 'deprivation indicators' to monitor progress of social protection policies in addressing the vulnerabilities of key marginalized social groups. In addition, the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Policy has a newly-established Social Innovation Fund. The Fund provides incentives for innovation in social policy that is based on practical experience and that improves the quality of NGO-government partnerships by incorporating lessons learned into strategic decisions.

In summary, some key features of evidence-informed governance policy at the sectoral level can be identified in the Serbian context. First, the evidence-informed approach to policymaking has been state-led, in contrast to broader governance policy knowledge production initiatives where efforts are primarily instigated by civil society. Thus there is a clear demand for research and for improved policy-making in general. This demand is partly driven by the need to devise effective solutions to tackle new social problems that have emerged in the last decade. The social exclusion phenomenon is the latest example. Second, the government has established several institutional mechanisms to facilitate 'systematic' production and collection of evidence, which helps to ensure the knowledge is taken up in policy processes. Civil Society Advisory Committees and the Social Innovation Fund are examples of those mechanisms. Third, policy actors are more inclined to expand the ownership of policy-making to civil society and to accept the evidence that is coming from NGOs than is generally the case with broader governance policy issues. Moreover, acceptance of the watchdog role of civil society is growing, specifically in terms of monitoring and evaluating the effective delivery of social protection programmes and rights through qualitative participatory methodologies. These trends are important as they suggest a model of more trusting and cooperative state-citizen relations leading towards more effective poverty reduction and social inclusion outcomes.

### 2.3. Peru: A Case Study in Re-Democratization

#### 2.3.1 Political Context

The starting point of the Peruvian case study is that the concept of democratic governance needs to be not only about voice and opportunities for participation but also needs to provide concrete development outcomes for the poor and marginalized. This is particularly important in the context of Peru's political and economic history. Peru's history highlights the fact that having a democratic regime is not enough to achieve effective governance as defined by the ability to reduce inequalities in everyday life regarding education, health, security, income, etc. The same was true of Peru's earlier experience with democratic administrations in the 1960s and 1980s, and other countries are experiencing similar situations, as seen in the slow progress in many parts of the world towards the Millennium Development Goals. By the same token, it is also possible to identify cases of non-democratic governments that achieved some success in effective governance, as in Peru's experience under Fujimori between 1992 and 2000.

Peru's most recent post-conflict experience with democratic governance began in September 2000 when President Alberto Fujimori, elected non-constitutionally for a third term, fled the country as news was emerging about political corruption created during his regime. The Organisation of American States provided a framework to assist in initiating an orderly transition. Dialogue Roundtables were created within the framework, involving the participation of political parties with parliamentary representation and the country's main civil society organizations. Through this mechanism a political solution was found: a transitional government presided over by Valentín Paniagua was formed and elections scheduled for July 2001. Alejandro Toledo, one of the leaders of the opposition to the regime of Alberto Fujimori and an ethnic American-Indian, was elected president. The following year he established a National Agreement whereby the government, political parties and CSOs would engage in dialogue on the future of the country.

#### 2.3.2 Governance Agenda Foci

In addition to the creation and maintenance of Toledo's National Agreement, the process of democratic transition gave priority to a number of key reforms:



### EVIDENCE-INFORMED POLICY IN POST-CONFLICT CONTEXTS

- 1) Establishment of an incipient anti-corruption system: this permitted the investigation and trial of cases of corruption carried out during the regime of Alberto Fujimori. This implied important changes in the judicial system, the investigative capacities of the Executive Branch and the prison system. At present, former President Fujimori, his advisor Vladimiro Montesinos and a significant number of former ministers and senior government officials are being tried for these crimes; several are already serving sentences.
- 2) Creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission: the TRC was in charge of investigating the two decades of political violence the country went through. This Commission concluded that the terrorist group Shining Path should be classified as a genocidal organization and that it held the greatest responsibility for the political violence that had claimed some 69,000 lives since 1980 in Peru. The Commission also denounced the existence of anti-insurgent policies carried out by the army as a violation of human rights. President Fujimori and several high-ranking military officers are currently being tried for human rights violations.
- 3) Initiation of political decentralization: This reform priority entailed the transfer of power and resources to the 26 regions that make up the country. The process arose mainly from the regions' demands for democracy and for opportunities for decentralized citizen participation in the policy and budget decision-making processes.

#### 2.3.3 Evidence on Governance

The production of governance evidence in Peru is limited, scattered, uneven and sporadic, and no common definition of governance exists either among international or local analysts working on this issue. This is largely due to the lack of an empirical research tradition within the academic and practitioner communities and the lack of available resources that can be used for research and data collection. Accordingly, Peruvian scholars have not been working towards the development of governance evidence and the collection and dissemination of empirical indicators. Instead, Peruvian scholars working on governance issues have been mainly concerned with obstacles to good governance and creating an agenda for a better future.

(1) The first area involves identifying blockages to improved governance in the country such as the lack of an institutionalized party system, active civil society, free media, effective social policies that can alleviate poverty, and the need to reform and decentralize the state.<sup>15</sup> (2) The second area of research is about developing an agenda of topics and policies that future governments should consider in order to achieve democratic consolidation. This agenda is in accordance with the goals of equity, transparency and effectiveness as well as the fulfilment of citizen rights, including improved quality of life.<sup>16</sup>

It is also important to note that local debates do not focus on general governance concepts or constructs (e.g. rule of law). Moreover, there are also systematic efforts to attempt to analyse the relative merits (or weaknesses) of existing international indicators in the Peruvian context compared to local assessment approaches. Moreover, there are differences due to how and where the information is gathered. [International governance evidence is largely based upon expert assessments, polls and surveys of government officials, business, and households; in contrast, locally-produced evidence produced by think tanks, research institutes and NGOs predominantly draws on official administrative data from, for example, the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Health. In this regard, Aragon and Vegas (2009) distinguish between the perception-based or 'subjective' governance evidence produced by international agencies versus the more technocratic or 'objective' governance evidence produced by local think tanks and research institutes drawing on government sources. Although in principle these two sources of data could be triangulated to create a more comprehensive picture of the state of governance

---

<sup>15</sup> Colectivo "Ciudadanos por un Buen Gobierno", op. cit.

<sup>16</sup> Martín Tanaka and Roxana Barrantes. "Aportes para la Gobernabilidad Democrática en el Perú. Los Desafíos Inmediatos," in *La Democracia en Perú, Vol. 2, Proceso Histórico y Agenda Pendiente*. Lima: PNUD-Perú, 2006.

in the country, to date these two sources seem to underpin two separate strands of dialogue (ibid).

### 2.3.4 Linkages That Facilitate Dissemination and Uptake of Governance Evidence

Aragon and Vegas (2009) distinguish between three sorts of broad governance evidence: human rights, corruption and governance practices (e.g. transparency). They argue that both the evidence production patterns and the dissemination and uptake dynamics are varied.

In the case of **human rights evidence**, the *Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos*, an umbrella CSO group focused on consolidating a culture of individual and collective human rights in the country, develops a widely-distributed annual report on the situation of human rights in Peru. The report typically focuses on a different topic each year (e.g. the criminalization of social conflicts, the government's authoritarian tendencies, trials about local and international human rights abuses). However, the Coordinadora's priority at present is public outreach and alliance building rather than the development of more rigorous and regularly reported indicators. Interviews with staff suggested that there is recognition of the importance of producing and collecting human rights information and evidence in order to develop greater credibility with government counterparts. However, time, resources and expertise to produce and analyse this type of evidence is largely lacking in CSOs in the human rights sector in Peru.

The development and dissemination of **governance evidence on corruption** appears more robust. *Proética*, an alliance of four Peruvian NGOs, was recognized in 2003 as the Peruvian chapter of Transparency International. It has produced a pioneering diagnostic of the main corruption risks in Peru, identifying four main challenges: (1) the weaknesses of government institutions in enforcing the rule of law; (2) a generalized culture of secrecy; (3) a lack of effective internal control mechanisms within government institutions; and (4) a lack of citizen anti-corruption awareness. *Proética* has also conducted five national public opinion surveys (2001, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008) and held conferences to discuss the main findings of these and other research findings with regional governments, civil society actors and national government officials.

Understanding of how and why corruption continues in the country has increased as a consequence of *Proética* research projects and initiatives. An increase in anti-corruption awareness and better knowledge on corruption are necessary but they are not sufficient for the development of effective anti-corruption policies. As Transparency International acknowledges,<sup>17</sup> effective anti-corruption policies demand the participation of all government and non-government stakeholders in these processes, as well as the existence of strong political will to use this information to develop policies that can prevent and fight corruption. Unfortunately, Jorge and Vegas (2009) conclude that due to the persistence of patron-client patterns of political relationships, effective anti-corruption policies do not seem to be a realistic prospect in contemporary Peru.

Perhaps the most successful area of widely utilized governance evidence can be seen in the field that Jorge and Vegas (2009) term '**governance practices**'. With the return of democracy in 2001, monitoring government practices has become a recurrent activity of some Peruvian NGOs and CSOs. Frequently, the idea behind these activities is to encourage elected authorities to adopt good government practices following the concept of democratic governance (i.e. improving the efficiency of public administration, improving the quality of public services, improving the relationship between authorities and citizens, etc.) *Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana* and *Ciudadanos al Día* are two leading NGOs in this field.

*Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana* is particularly focused on decentralization reforms and has created a special project, *Participa Perú*, with the following aims: to provide information to citizens on the current process of decentralization and its legal initiatives; to open and consolidate channels and mechanisms of citizen participation at national, regional and local government levels; to support the creation and consolidation of mechanisms through which citizens will be able to

<sup>17</sup> Transparency International (2006) 'Herramientas para Medir la Corrupción y la Gobernabilidad en Países Latinoamericanos'. Departamento de Políticas de Investigación de Transparency International.

know about the impact of decentralization policies and the performance of elected authorities; and to support the development of civil society opinions and initiatives regarding specific decentralization laws. As part of this project, the organization has created a system of citizen watchdogs, *Vigila Perú*, to monitor the current process of decentralization. The main goal of this system is to develop the capabilities of regional civil societies to analyse, monitor and participate in the process of decentralization. One of its specific goals is to change authorities' attitudes and behaviours in order to foster the development of a transparent and participative public administration. A very particular component of this initiative is the creation of periodic reports that contain indicators of key components of national, regional and local governments (e.g. quality of the regional budget execution, level of transparency of the regional public administration, quality of regional education and health systems, etc.).

Among all these components, *Vigila Perú* has been particularly active and successful in monitoring the extent to which regional governments are fulfilling the requirements of the recently promulgated Transparency and Access to Information Law. The main method used is a periodic assessment of the web pages of regional governments to see whether they contain the minimum required information about the public budget, public acquisitions, the agenda of the regional president, etc. The final outcome is a score that allows the measurement of the level of transparency of regional governments. An official from *Vigila Perú* notes that regional governments are very frequently concerned about their transparency scores and rankings, which are published in a variety of media (e.g. booklets, Internet, public presentations, newspapers) and tend to implement recommendations made by *Group Propuesta Ciudadana*. This appears to be a successful case of monitoring and improving government practices, although more analysis is needed to understand the impact on actual service delivery and poverty reduction outcomes.

The second case, *Ciudadanos al Día*, is also a CSO concerned with the improvement of the quality of public administration. Its main strategy is to identify successful cases of government practice that benefit citizens, and to draw public and government attention through high-profile media dissemination of their annual Good Government Practice Awards. These awards draw on a methodology based on three steps: (1) the definition of problems in the functioning of the public administration; (2) the identification of all the initiatives taken to solve the problems; and (3) the generation of quantitative and qualitative indicators to assess the level of effectiveness of the initiatives taken. Another contribution has been the identification of 15 categories that can be used to identify good government practices (e.g. transparency and access to information, customer services in public offices, social inclusion, citizen participation, public-private cooperation, relationship with media, etc.) plus a set of attributes for each one of these categories.

### **2.3.5 Sectoral Level Dynamics**

Education policy debate in Peru in the past few years has been marked by a strong consensus around the need to develop participatory education policies, consolidate indicators about internal efficiency, and change the management of the sector.<sup>18</sup> Processes for consultation and citizen participation in the education sector were established within the broader national framework of the democratic transition. The transitional government initiated a national consultation on education, led by a group of 25 renowned experts who represented diverse stakeholder groups and the educational community. The conclusions of the consultation were in turn used by the National Agreement Forum in order to formulate state policy and to enact a new General Law on Education in 2003, as well as to create an autonomous and independent body that would foster the formulation of long-term policies and the participation of civil society. This led to the creation under the government of Alejandro Toledo in April 2003 of the National Council for Education (NCE), with the mandate to participate in the formulation, agreement, follow-up and evaluation of the National Education Project. Although not comprised of representatives of institutions, the Council enjoys strong legitimacy and indeed, some analysts have likened the NCE to a public think tank.

---

<sup>18</sup> Cuenca, R. (2008) 'Balance de la Investigación en Educación 2004-2007', in Consorcio de Investigación Económica y Social *La Investigación Económica y Social en el Perú, 2004-2007*. Lima: CIES.

In order to explore the dynamics of knowledge generation, Aragon and Vegas (2009) focus on the role of the National Council for Education in the formulation of Peruvian education policies, within the framework of a governance crisis. The government of Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006) started with significant challenges, including a weak political base and the absence of a parliamentary majority in Congress, which led to multiple cabinet reshuffles. The Dañino cabinet reshuffle in July 2002 was partly due to the problems in education policies. In the months leading up to this change, between March and June, the country experienced a long teachers' strike that was poorly managed by the Education Minister at the time. The strike ended in an agreement with the teachers' union<sup>19</sup> that many experts and the National Council for Education questioned as it gave rise to what could be termed a 'co-government' between the Ministry and the teachers' union, with the latter being granted excessive power. The experts concluded that education policies had been reduced to labour issues, and this prevented the country from addressing the poor quality of education; the OECD-led PISA education assessment ranked Peru lowest of all participating countries. The National Council for Education accordingly pressed for the education sector to be declared in a state of emergency and when the new Prime Minister took office in 2003 she called on the Council to develop a new education policy strategy for 2004-2006. The situation enabled this think tank to go beyond its previous technical role and become politically engaged as it endeavoured to achieve agreements on its education policy proposals with the main political parties and civil society.

The number of education research projects has increased in recent years. More than 80 research initiatives in education and/or education policy received funding from the government, donors and INGOs between 2004 and 2007.<sup>20</sup> Most attention has been focused on: (1) student performance and determinants of learning and student achievement;<sup>21</sup> (2) the decentralization of the education sector and the role of a decentralized administration; and (3) policies on training teachers and the relationship between the state and the teachers' union (SUTEP). However, most of these efforts have concluded by pointing out the need for future research rather than by making policy recommendations. As such, research on education can be seen as filling gaps in basic information needed to reform the sector. It is not yet focusing on broader issues about the quality of governance in the education sector, including indicators regarding the availability of resources for the sector, levels of efficiency and transparency in the implementation of education policies, and questions of institutional capacity.<sup>22</sup>

### **3. CROSS-COUNTRY LESSONS**

This section is a comparative discussion of the similarities and differences in the dynamics of governance evidence production, translation and uptake in the three case studies. It draws on the analytical framework on governance evidence-informed policy processes presented in the companion literature review paper (see Jones et al., 2009), which is based on analysis by Pomares and Jones (forthcoming) on sector-specific evidence-informed policy dynamics. This framework is informed by the insights of the RAPID framework but seeks to drill down into sector-specific dynamics of the knowledge-policy interface and to analyse the extent to which the relationship between knowledge and policy in governance issues is similar to that in other policy sectors. The framework is organized in two clusters: those related to variables of the *policy issue* in question and those dealing with the *policy process* in which a particular policy issue is debated. The policy context variables are not unique to the sector but intersect in important ways in shaping the dynamics of evidence production, translation and uptake (see figure).

---

<sup>19</sup> The teachers' union, SUTEP, is the largest union in Peru as it is compulsory for the 250,000 teachers that work for the state to join it. Although the leaders belong to a political party, during periods of conflict it has great capacity to mobilize teachers and possesses legitimacy among them. On the one hand, it has a left-wing discourse marked by the leadership of the political party Patria Roja, but at the same time it almost exclusively defends teachers' labor demands.

<sup>20</sup> Cuenca (2008), op. cit.

<sup>21</sup> This topic has often been related to considerations of quality and equity in the education sector.

<sup>22</sup> Cuenca (2008), op. cit.




Diagram II: Governance policy in comparative perspective

In this section, the authors examine similarities and differences among the three cases both in terms of general governance debates as well as through the more detailed sector-level case study findings from each country: education in Nepal and Peru and social protection in Serbia. A summary version is found in table 1.

### 3.1. Background Context: Human and Economic Development

#### 3.1.1 Technical Expertise

*General technical expertise:* Establishing the authoritative role of knowledge in post-conflict situations is often a challenge because the technical reputation of intellectuals cannot be disentangled from their role in previous authoritarian regimes. It will therefore partly depend on the way in which the end of the conflict was negotiated, and the extent to which civil society was repressed during the conflict period. In all three case studies, the governments that presided over the conflict were ousted from power, and thus intellectuals who were associated with these governments have been largely discredited. In the cases of Serbia and Peru, there was strong repression of civil society, and in Nepal this was compounded by a severe lack of resources in knowledge generation and knowledge translation processes.

The emergence from conflict requires technical evidence to support policy and programme development that may not be available in a post-conflict country. A lack of baseline data and the need for building evidence from scratch is a specific challenge of post-conflict environments, and one which again is facing all three of the countries under analysis.

*Sector-specific technical expertise:* The demands for specific technical expertise did not represent a major barrier for participation in policy debates; instead debates around education and social protection in all three cases have had a strong emphasis on community participation in agenda setting and implementation, monitoring and evaluation processes.

#### 3.1.2 Level of Contestation

*General level of contestation:* While the need for public administration reforms and a greater degree of decentralization is generally recognized as a critical part of post-conflict reforms, governance issues related to human rights in post-conflict environments are highly emotional and often subject to high levels of contestation. In Nepal, because of the still-fragile nature of the transition and ongoing political violence especially in the Terai region, human rights issues remain a subject of considerable debate but no national consensus on how to address them effectively has been reached to date, in part because of the power-sharing arrangement between the Maoists and the National Congress party in the current government. In Serbia this contestation has been framed largely as an issue of domestic versus international forces with the EU and the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague playing key roles in the prosecution of human rights violations. This has meant that a domestic debate about how to reach closure on the human rights violations perpetrated during the 1990s has been effectively truncated. By contrast, in Peru closure has effectively been reached through the conclusion and publication of the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee, which recognized that more than 65,000

citizens had been victims of the conflict between the national army and the Maoist guerrilla group, the Shining Path, many of whom were from poor indigenous populations.

*Sector-specific level of contestation:* The education sector in Nepal has experienced high levels of contestation to the extent that teachers and students have often been at the forefront of political uprisings. There has been a high level of political interference in the sector, especially with regard to teacher qualification exams and the regulation of private schools. In short, governance reforms remain a distant reality in the education sector in Nepal.

By contrast, in Serbia the level of contestation in the social protection sector was low relative to other sectors, due to a strong consensus on the need to tackle social exclusion. Likewise, in Peru the level of contestation in the education sector was low compared to other sectors because of the critical work that an umbrella group, 'Agreement on the Fight Against Poverty', has carried out to promote agreement on social policies.

### **3.1.3 Strength of Economic Interests**

*General strength of economic interests:* Economic interests may act as sources of resistance to much-needed reforms in post-conflict settings, especially regarding anti-corruption initiatives. This has been the case to a significant extent in Serbia where private sector actors have played a major role in financing political parties to support their own interests, and in part account for the very high level of party fragmentation in the country. Nepal scored 131<sup>st</sup> out of 180 countries on the 2008 Global Corruption Report. In response to very high levels of corruption, Nepal successfully passed a range of new laws promoting greater transparency and accountability in the immediate post-conflict period, but implementation of these laws and awareness thereof remains weak—suggesting that economic interests are still retarding governance reforms. In Peru, although greater awareness of anti-corruption measures has been facilitated by new civil society groups such as Proetica, implementation also remains a serious challenge.

*Sector-specific strength of economic interests:* Economic interests played a relatively small role in shaping governance reforms at the sector-level in the three case studies. Even in Peru, where there was a process of 'moralization of the education sector' focused on reducing corruption, this was motivated by the desire to improve teaching quality rather than to counteract major economic corruption.

### **3.1.4 Level of Internationalization**

*General level of internationalization:* The trade-off between domestic ownership and internationally-supported knowledge production efforts is amplified in post-conflict environments. In Serbia, the EU accession guidelines have been especially influential in terms of public administration reforms and human rights issues, but this international influence has come with significant costs in terms of limited public buy-in to these issues. Because Nepal's post-conflict accord is still fragile, international agencies have sought to play an important brokering role in facilitating policy dialogue around governance issues. For instance, DFID has supported participatory governance initiatives, Transparency International has been very active in promoting anti-corruption initiatives and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has been a key player in human rights debates and initiatives. In Peru, human rights debates have been strongly influenced by broader international movements and agendas, but because of a relatively strong and innovative civil society, national ownership of these issues is increasing.

*Sector-specific level of internationalization:* In Nepal, international influences have been a very important driver in shaping policy reform priorities. Key examples include the Education for All Plan and the Early Child Development Plan in keeping with global commitments, native-language education in line with International Labour Organisation commitments, and the establishment of a sector-wide approach supported by the World Bank and the Norwegian Government. In Peru, international standards have also played a key role in catalyzing governance reforms at the education sector level. Following the publication of the 2003 OECD Report on the Programme for International Student Assessment in which Peru scored worst overall, the sector was declared to be in a state of national emergency, leading to the creation of the Social Pact

of Reciprocal Commitments for Education. The Pact called for a re-conceptualization of teaching as a career and for improved teacher training opportunities.

Interestingly, in the area of social protection in Serbia, there has been greater domestic level buy-in than with other more general governance reforms, although there is still considerable interest in and uptake of international discourses, especially with regard to the rights of the disabled and Roma populations.

### 3.2. Policy Process Variables

The transitional nature of the governments under study has had an impact in terms of the type of **policy change** and the **stage in which the policy change** was sought, in both general and sector-specific governance reforms. The focus of governance reform has tended to be on seeking discursive, process and legislative changes at the agenda and policy formulation stages. Attention to implementation and monitoring and evaluation is obviously a critical concern if more democratic practices are to be consolidated, but knowledge production in this area is still in the early stages of development.

In post-conflict settings, **issue champions** have grown quickly, emerging from a relatively low base after years of repression and closed policy spaces. They have been hampered to some extent by limited demand for policy research, except from international actors. At the sectoral level, the picture is somewhat more optimistic. In **Peru**, key reforms have been supported by a number of well-respected independent think tanks with expertise in education, including the National Education Council. Similarly, in **Serbia**, civil society issue champions in the field of social protection are relatively dense, and have become more coordinated in their evidence-informed policy advocacy efforts through the PRS NGO Focal Point mechanism and the Social Investment Fund. In **Nepal**, however, there are few civil society issue champions; policy change has instead been led by highly politicized governmental education commissions and teachers' associations.

As discussed above, the tendency has been to rely on internationally-generated knowledge production on governance issues in post-conflict settings. More recent initiatives, however, have invested in the long-term process of increasing skills **capacities of domestic research institutions**. At the sectoral level, there are promising developments in both Peru and Serbia. In Peru, capacities in terms of knowledge actors (on the production side) are quite high both in think tanks and university departments and the NCE has done much to improve capacities on the government side of the equation. In Serbia, knowledge actors in both the government and civil society are relatively strong and well-coordinated compared to other sectors, in large part because of the recognition on the part of the government that effective policy change will necessitate strong civil society and community participation. In Nepal, however, institutional capacities among civil society think tanks as well as government institutes are very weak, as recognized by the capacity development support now being offered by the Norwegian Government to the sector. At present, there is no overarching approach to strengthening knowledge production and communication processes in Nepal.

**Table 1: Governance evidence-informed policy dynamics in post-conflict settings**

Policy issue	Governance in post-conflict settings	Governance at the sectoral level
Type and level of technical expertise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>√ The authoritative role of knowledge in post-conflict situations is often a challenge. The technical reputation of intellectuals cannot be disentangled from their role in previous authoritarian regimes.</li> <li>√ The emergence from conflict requires technical evidence to support policy and programme development that may not be available in a country. A lack of baseline data and the need for building evidence from scratch is a specific challenge of post-conflict environments.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>√ There is not a high level of technical expertise required to participate in either the education or social protection sectors. Nevertheless, in <b>Peru</b> a key role was assigned to the National Education Council (comprised of education professionals) in shaping reform proposals for education policy in the post-transition government. There was also a strong group of think tanks with education expertise upon which to rely.</li> <li>√ In <b>Nepal</b>, because the focus has been on increasing community management of schools, including mobile schools for remote communities, high levels of technical expertise have not been demanded.</li> <li>√ In <b>Serbia</b>, the government recognized that they lacked knowledge on specific vulnerable groups, especially Roma, and NGOs came to play a key role in filling this information gap.</li> </ul>
Level of contestation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>√ Governance issues related to human rights in post-conflict environments are highly emotional.</li> <li>√ The role of evidence in the work of truth and reconciliation committees is extremely complex and reveals the problems of conceiving evidence as 'objective facts' constructed in an ahistorical fashion.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>√ In <b>Nepal</b> the education sector has been quite highly contested, in part because students and teachers have often been at the forefront of revolutionary movements. There has been considerable political interference in the sector, including around private school regulation and teacher qualification exams.</li> <li>√ In <b>Peru</b>, the sector is arguably one of the least polarized in part because of the post-transition establishment of the Agreement on the Fight Against Poverty, a public body that promotes agreement with respect to social policies.</li> <li>√ In <b>Serbia</b>, social protection is an area where there is a strong consensus among government and civil actors alike that reform is essential to tackle social exclusion and vulnerabilities of marginalized social groups. An exception is perhaps the demand by elderly rights groups for increased pension payments.</li> </ul>
Strength of economic interests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>√ Economic interests may act as sources of resistance to much needed reforms, especially regarding anti-corruption initiatives.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>√ In <b>Nepal</b>, economic interests have played a relatively minor role in the education sector, as is also the case in Serbia in the social protection field. In Peru, economic interests have played a relatively minor role, in part because of what has been termed the 'moralization' of the sector. i.e. a strong emphasis on anti-corruption principles and practices.</li> </ul>

EVIDENCE-INFORMED POLICY IN POST-CONFLICT CONTEXTS

<p>Level of internationalisation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>√ The relative importance of international influences appears to be particularly heightened in the case of post-conflict settings.</li> <li>√ In Serbia, the EU accession guidelines have been especially influential in terms of public administration reforms and human rights issues.</li> <li>√ In Nepal, Transparency International has been very active in promoting anti-corruption initiatives and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has been a key player in human rights debates and initiatives.</li> <li>√ In Peru, human rights debates have been strongly influenced by broader international movements and agendas.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>√ In <b>Nepal</b> there has been quite a high level of internationalization in the sector, especially with regard to Education for All, Early Child Development and mother tongue programmes in line with international commitments. The World Bank and the Norwegian Government have played a key role in sector-wide approaches and related conditionalities.</li> <li>√ In <b>Peru</b>, the OECD Report on the Programme for International Student Assessment published in 2003 had a major impact on subsequent policy directions. Peru was ranked worst in the report and this led to the declaration of an emergency status in the sector and the creation of the Social Pact of Reciprocal Commitments for Education, which sought to improve the quality of teacher training and professional development opportunities.</li> <li>√ In <b>Serbia</b>, the goal of EU accession has contributed to the national buy-in to the social protection agenda.</li> </ul>
<p>Number and strength of issue champions</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>√ In post-conflict settings, issue champions have grown quickly but from a relatively low base after years of repression and closed policy spaces. They have also been hampered to some extent by limited demand for policy research, except from international actors.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>√ In <b>Peru</b>, there are a number of well-respected independent think tanks with expertise in education that have supported key reforms, including the National Education Council.</li> <li>√ In <b>Nepal</b>, there are few civil society issue champions; policy change has instead been led by highly politicized governmental education commissions and teachers associations.</li> <li>√ In <b>Serbia</b>, civil society issue champions are relatively dense, and have become more coordinated in their evidence-informed policy advocacy efforts through the PRS NGO Focal Point mechanism and the Social Investment Fund.</li> </ul>
<p>Stage of the policy process</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>√ In post-conflict settings, knowledge actors have been most successful at the policy agenda setting stage but the jury is still out with regards to implementation and monitoring and evaluation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>√ In <b>Nepal</b>, the focus of reforms to date has been at the agenda-setting stage, with a strong focus on community management as well as sectoral level reforms.</li> <li>√ In <b>Peru</b>, the focus has been partly on agenda setting (especially in terms of emphasising quality) but as importantly on improved policy implementation including eradicating corruption.</li> <li>√ In <b>Serbia</b>, the focus has been on process (involving citizens in consultation processes) and also on monitoring and evaluation of social protection outcomes.</li> </ul>
<p>Type of change involved</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>√ In post-conflict settings, actors predominantly tailor knowledge to encourage <b>discursive</b> commitments from states and to secure changes in policy such as the passage of new <b>regulations</b>. This is understandable as much legislation was either missing or had to be updated at the start of the reform process.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>√ In <b>Peru</b>, actors have predominantly tailored knowledge to encourage improved processes (professionalization of the teaching profession) and behavioural changes.</li> <li>√ In <b>Nepal</b>, the focus has been on process changes, with strong support for the introduction of a sector-wide approach</li> <li>√ In <b>Serbia</b>, the focus has also been on process changes, and the wider involvement of citizens in policy design and monitoring and evaluation processes.</li> </ul>

<b>Institutional capacities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>√ The trade-off between domestic ownership and internationally-supported knowledge production efforts is amplified in post-conflict environments. The tendency has been to rely on internationally-generated knowledge production but more recent initiatives have invested in the long-term process of increasing skills capacities of domestic research institutions.</li> <li>√ Peru is the most advanced of the three case studies in this respect, with interesting citizen participation and monitoring work around pro-poor budget monitoring, decentralization and public administration.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>√ In <b>Nepal</b>, institutional capacities both among civil society think tanks and government institutes are very weak, as recognized by the capacity development support now being offered by the Norwegian Government to the sector.</li> <li>√ In <b>Peru</b>, capacities in terms of knowledge actors (on the production side) are quite high (both in think tanks and university departments) and the NCE has done much to improve capacities on the government side of the equation.</li> <li>√ In <b>Serbia</b>, knowledge actors on both the government and civil society are relatively strong and well-coordinated compared to other sectors.</li> </ul>
---------------------------------	---	---

## 4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The supply and demand of governance-related evidence in the three post-conflict country case studies is limited and fragmented. Peru and Serbia are now beyond the initial and highly fragile immediate post-conflict period, and there are a number of examples of good practice in terms of knowledge generation and knowledge translation on effective governance.

In keeping with broader findings on the knowledge-policy interface, political context factors emerge as the most salient determinants of evidence-informed policy processes. In Nepal, a low-income country with very low HDI indicators, the conditions for both the supply and demand of governance evidence are largely absent as the country faces ongoing political unrest and major challenges in terms of establishing a national agreement on the new democratic 'rules of the game'. Countries in this situation are not helped by the research funding patterns and practices of international donor agencies, which encourage an individual consultancy model rather than embedded think tanks and policy research institutions that could over time play a more substantive role in policy dialogue processes.

The political contexts in Peru and Serbia are somewhat more conducive to the production of governance evidence. Both countries have better HDI indicators, including relatively high literacy levels, are middle income countries and are consolidating democratic administrations, having achieved successful transfers of power to opposition political parties through free and fair elections. Civil society groups, especially in the areas of corruption and monitoring of decentralization reforms, are relatively active and engaged in disseminating research findings to the public in innovative ways. The demand for such knowledge by government actors remains limited. The social protection and education sectors, however, present examples of sectors in which there is a reasonable degree of government interest in improved performance and strengthening state-citizen partnerships.

In terms of linkages, donor agencies, international NGOs and development partners play an unmistakably dominant role in shaping governance discourses. They do so either through the collection of data and reporting against internationally standardized governance indicators, or through the funding of governance research projects on issues such as corruption and transparency. This is particularly the case in Serbia, where governance debates are heavily influenced by EU accession processes at the cost of limited national buy-in (especially in the case of human rights debates). For the most part, there is limited dialogue between international understandings of governance and locally-derived concepts and measurement tools, although arguably such a conversation could prove fruitful in moving towards a more complex understanding of the sequencing and contours of effective governance processes in post-conflict societies. In order to achieve such a conversation on a sustainable basis, however, this paper's findings suggest that a critical first step is greater commitment to the financing and provision of capacity development for think tanks/policy research knowledge institutes, including by donors and other international organizations. This could also usefully include North-South and South-South part-

nerships to promote local production and usage of governance evidence, such as the global programme on governance assessments coordinated by UNDP.<sup>23</sup>


In terms of knowledge production, only in Peru has there been any significant attention to monitoring progress against human rights indicators or the successful conclusion of a Truth and Reconciliation Committee. And even in the Peruvian case, a culture of evidence production and dissemination in the human rights field was weaker than in other areas of governance such as corruption, governance practices and social sector governance. This relative invisibility could be partly a result of timing and sequencing of reforms. Perhaps in Serbia and Nepal these issues are still too raw or contested given the relatively fragile political stability; or perhaps citizens prioritize other aspects of quality of life such as basic service provision (especially for excluded groups) more highly once peace has been achieved.

Greater emphasis on participatory governance assessments would appear to be critical in order to understand citizen priorities in the short- and longer-terms, and in order to develop a stronger consensus on the package and timing of governance reforms in specific contexts. While there is no recognized format for a Participatory Governance Assessment (PGA), there is broad consensus that conventional governance assessments have failed to incorporate adequately the views of poor and marginalized groups (e.g. on the basis of gender, ethnicity or spatial/geographic poverty). Conventional assessments also have made inadequate use of mixed methods of analysis, and have not sufficiently disentangled the role of unequal power relations, including the politics at play in the writing of assessments themselves. PGAs matter because they allow a clearer and more accurate understanding of how people at the grassroots level perceive, experience and practice citizenship, as well as the barriers they face in doing so (Jones et al., 2009). What is clear from this analysis is that post-conflict environments are immensely complex and the dynamics of the supply and uptake of governance evidence are varied and uneven, underscoring the importance of developing an evolutionary learning approach rather than a one-size-fits-all model.

---

<sup>23</sup> The UNDP approach encourages multi-stakeholder platforms to define governance parameters, the building of indicators, collection of information, as well as the validation and dissemination of results and dissemination thereof. It is an approach UNDP is currently promoting in 15 countries worldwide. <http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs08/UNDPposlobrochureEN.pdf> and [http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs08/Global\\_Programme\\_on\\_DG\\_Assessments.pdf](http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs08/Global_Programme_on_DG_Assessments.pdf)

Appendix 1: RAPID Framework



**Appendix 2: RAPID Framework Analysis of Governance Evidence Dynamics in Post-Conflict Societies**

	<b>Nepal</b>	<b>Peru</b>	<b>Serbia</b>
<b>Context</b> (political and policy sector environmental factors)	<p>I. Low HDI, high inequalities</p> <p>II. Most recent transition from conflict; ex-Maoist rebels now democratically elected ruling party. Challenge in breaking with top-down decision making based on strict social hierarchies.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improving HDI but high inequalities</li> <li>Arguably most successful of the three in terms of post-conflict transition; Truth and Reconciliation Committee concluded and previous conflict threats very low now; peaceful transfer of power to opposition party indicates country on road to democratic consolidation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Highest HDI, but major economic challenges facing costly war and NATO-imposed sanctions, in ensuring previous levels of social protection to populace.</li> </ul> <p>Minimal focus on post-conflict dimensions; more focused on compliance with conditions for EU accession. Highly donor-driven agenda. Conflict with non-Serb territories (i.e. with Montenegro and Kosovo) persisted post-2000.</p>
<b>Evidence on governance</b> (both quality and packaging)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Limited knowledge production, both supply and demand. Where it is, largely donor driven.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fragmented and limited evidence production, but nevertheless some examples of good practice in areas of corruption and governance practices</li> <li>Major distinction and little dialogue between perception-oriented governance evidence produced by international agencies on Peru and more technocratic-oriented governance evidence produced by local state and non-state institutions</li> </ul>	<p>Fragmented and limited evidence production, except in the areas of corruption and monitoring of civic participation at the decentralized level.</p>
		<p>Major distinction and little dialogue between perception-oriented governance evidence produced by international agencies on Peru and more technocratic-oriented governance evidence produced by local state and non-state institutions.</p>	
<b>Links</b> (between knowledge generators, translators and con-	Absence of independent think tanks and knowledge institutes	Burgeoning civil society groups, but limited time, resources and interest in research production, including on governance. Nevertheless some examples of good practice undertaking	Limited civil society, especially in area of governance reforms and limited number of think tanks. Most initiatives are heavily donor driven. But good example of national institute on social

sumers)		both innovative generation of governance knowledge and innovative knowledge translation practices.	protection as well as initiatives to promote co-ordination on knowledge generation and knowledge translation in this field.
	Research environment largely dominated by consultancy model		

## REFERENCES:

- Aragon, J. and M. Vegas (2009). "Production and use of governance evidence in Peru and comparative analysis of education governance and evidence". Report commissioned by UNDP Governance Centre, Oslo.
- Begovic B. and Mijatovic B. (2007) Corruption in Serbia – five years later, CLDS, Belgrade.
- Bhatta, B. (2009). "Evidence-informed policy in a post-conflict context: assessing improvements in governance". Report commissioned by UNDP Governance Centre, Oslo.
- Bjeloglav et al. (2007) LSMS Project 2002–2003: Life in Serbia through Survey Data, Strategic Marketing, Belgrade.
- Bogićević et al. (2002), Poverty in Serbia and Reform of Governmental Assistance for the Poor, Center for Liberal and Democratic Studies, Belgrade.
- Bogićević et al. (2003) "Poverty and Reform of Financial Support to the Poor", Ministry of Social Affairs and Center for Liberal and Democratic Studies, Belgrade.
- Cheema, G.S. and Rondinelli, D. (2007). Decentralizing Governance: Emerging Concepts and Practices, Washington D.C: Brookings Institution.
- Court, J., I. Hovland, et al., eds. (2005). *Bridging research and policy in development: evidence and the change process*. Rugby, ITDG Publishing.
- Cvejić and Babović (2008) Social and economic position of IDPs in Serbia, UNDP and UNHCR.
- DFID and the World Bank. 2006. 'Unequal Citizens: Gender, Caste and Ethnic Exclusion in Nepal'. Gender and Social Exclusion Assessment Team. Kathmandu, Nepal.
- European Commission (2008) Serbia 2008 Progress Report, EC.
- Gavrilovic, M. (2009). "Bringing Governance Evidence into the Policy Process: Opportunities and Challenges in post-conflict Serbia". Report commissioned by UNDP Governance Centre, Oslo.
- Jones, N., J. Pomares, A. Pellini, with A. Datta (2009). "The role of evidence-informed policy in governance debates: a synthesis paper with a particular focus on post-conflict environments". Report commissioned by UNDP Governance Centre, Oslo.
- Jones, N., with Binod Bhatta, Gerard Gill, Sara Pantuliano, Hukum Bahadur Singh, Deepak Tim-sina, Shizu Uppadhaya and David Walker (2009). Governance and citizenship from below: views of poor and excluded groups and their vision for a New Nepal. ODI Working Paper 301. Overseas Development Institute: London.
- Levitsky, S. 1999. "Fujimori and Post-Party Politics in Peru" in *Journal of Democracy* 10.3 (1999) 78-92.
- Milivojevic (2006) CIVICUS Index of Civil Society in Serbia, CIVICUS Study.
- ODI and NEPAN [Nepal Participatory Action Network] (2007). *Governance and citizenship from below: Views of poor & excluded groups and their vision for a New Nepal*, Report commissioned by DFID and Nepal Planning commission, London and Kathmandu.
- Rondinelli, D. A. and J. D. Montgomery (2005). "Regime change and nation building: can donors restore governance in post-conflict states?" *Public Administration and Development* 25: 15-23.
- Transparency Serbia (2008) Bilten August-October 2008, Transparency Serbia, Belgrade.
- UNDP (2007). Human Development report 2007/08. Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World, New York: Palgrave MacMillan and UNDP.
- World Bank (2001). Nepal Priorities and Strategies for Education Reform, Kathmandu.
- World Bank (2008). World Development report: Reshaping Economic Geography, Washington D.C.
- World Bank (2004). Nepal Country Assistance Strategy 2004-2007, Kathmandu.