



## GOVERNANCE EVIDENCE IN PERU: PRODUCTION AND USE IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR

Jorge Aragon and Martin Vegas  
*Universidad Antonio Ruiz de Montoya*

### Abstract:

Concerns about governance in Peru have increased in importance since the return of democracy in 2001. Consequently, local production of evidence on governance is currently ongoing in the country. However, data collection tends to be scattered, unsystematic and uneven, and varies significantly depending on the government dimension or area under consideration. For example, most of the empirical research on social policy in Peru — carried out mainly by non-governmental and local research institutes and think tanks — has aimed at obtaining basic or baseline information on social sectors, currently lacking in the country, in order to suggest specific policies, or has had the objective of analysing data collected by the State. By the same token, it is the case that in Peru the production of governance evidence in some sectors (e.g. the education sector) has some clear advantages vis-à-vis other ones (e.g. the human rights sector). This paper is divided into three sections. The first presents a general framework for the discussion of governance, democratic governance and governance evidence. The second presents a preliminary map of the production and use of governance evidence and indicators in Peru. The final section analyses the specific case of education policy in Peru between 2001 and 2004, and the production and use of empirical evidence on education governance. One of the main goals of this last section is to draw some lessons about the main challenges for evidence-based policy and governance in Peru.

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**United Nations  
Development Programme**

Oslo Governance Centre  
Democratic Governance Group  
Bureau for Development Policy

Borggata 2B, Postboks 2881 Tøyen  
0608 Oslo, Norway

Phone +47 23 06 08 20  
Fax +47 23 06 08 21  
[oslogovcentre@undp.org](mailto:oslogovcentre@undp.org)  
[www.undp.org/oslocentre](http://www.undp.org/oslocentre)

## 1. GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE: MEANING AND INDICATORS

In an era characterized by the expansion of representative regimes across all regions of the world and the development of an important consensus regarding the virtues of democracy as a type of political regime, most international and domestic concerns now focus on how to improve governance and quality of life.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, it has become evident that one of the most important challenges for the maintenance and consolidation of democratic experiments in the developing world lies in the persistence of widespread poverty and social inequality. It is in this context that the concept of democratic governance has turned out to be of extreme relevance. The best way to grasp the meaning and implications of this situation is to take into consideration its two components: democracy and governance.

### 1.1 Definitions

There is probably no need to say much about the meaning of democracy. Democracy as 'government of the people' means that the decisions that affect everyone should be taken by everyone. Therefore, democracy implies governments elected by popular vote, but also the existence of institutions and mechanisms that can make possible public debate and the resolution of all issues that affect the collective interest. Democracy, as a very particular type of political regime, is characterized by the political participation of all citizens, political competition among different political parties, political representation for citizens and political accountability. Finally, none of the political principles that characterize democratic regimes will be meaningful unless citizens are guaranteed their civil rights (e.g. guarantees against oppression), political rights (e.g. the right to be part of the public or collective decision-making process) and social rights (e.g. the right to live in safety and security).<sup>2</sup>

The study of governance has come a long way since it first appeared as a new and vague topic. It occupies a prominent position in several disciplines and academic and practitioner communities. However, and despite its recent popularity, the concept means different things to different people.<sup>3</sup> Most definitions overlap in important ways, yet it is possible to identify some key differences. In some cases, governance is defined mainly in terms of the process of policy-making (e.g. how the rules of a political regime provide the context in which policy-making is carried out).<sup>4</sup> In other cases, governance is defined mainly in terms of policy implementation and results (e.g. the capacity of governments to effectively formulate and implement sound policies).<sup>5</sup> In practice, it is very common to find approaches to governance that are all-encompassing. For example, some scholars suggest that governance concerns the traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised in a country (e.g. the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced or the extent to which citizens and authorities respect the institutions that govern economic and social interactions between them). Along with traditions and institutions, they add the capacity of government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies as another dimension of governance.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Tulchin, J.S. (ed.) (2002) *Democratic Governance and Social Inequality*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

<sup>2</sup> United Nations Development Programme (2004) *Democracy in Latin America. Towards a Citizen's Democracy*. New York: UNDP.

<sup>3</sup> Hyden, G., J. Court and K. Mease (2004) *Making Sense of Governance. Empirical Evidence from 16 Developing Countries*. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

<sup>4</sup> Institut Internacional de Governabilitat de Catalunya (2005) *Perfiles Nacionales de Gobernabilidad: República del Perú*. Barcelona: IIGC.

<sup>5</sup> Colectivo Ciudadanos por un Buen Gobierno (2005) *Los Nudos Críticos de la Gobernabilidad. Propuestas para un Buen Gobierno*. Stockholm: International IDEA.

<sup>6</sup> Kauffman, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2008) *Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2007*. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute Global Governance Program.

Governance has different dimensions (i.e. process of policymaking, process of policy implementation and policy outcomes), all of which are critical factors for academics, practitioners and authorities concerned with human development. It is important to be aware of which dimensions are being considered when discussing and researching governance and its impact on human wellbeing. Depending on the particular dimension, some evidence will be more or less relevant. For example, in dealing with governance as policy implementation and policy results, it will be extremely useful to have evidence on not only the formal rules but also the capacity of government institutions to be effective. Therefore, when dealing with evidence-based governance, one needs to be clear about which specific dimension of governance is being considered in order to identify and collect the relevant evidence.

Accordingly, democratic governance entails the challenge of developing forms of governance that are both effective and democratic. In other words, democratic governance is about the challenge of formulating and implementing policies through a process of public debate that guarantees greater diversity in terms of opinions, interests and options. It also requires a State with enough power to fulfil the mandates given by the people. If 'good' governance can be considered critical to achieving development and peace across the world, the development of 'democratic' governance is the best route to achieving these goals.

The concept of democratic governance makes it possible to address the development of effective governance in a democratic context. This is particularly important because having a democratic regime is not enough to achieve effective governance.<sup>7</sup> Many developing countries have elected or representative governments that are unable to reduce the inequalities present in everyday life, such as in education, security, income, wealth, etc.<sup>8</sup> By the same token, non-democratic governments have had some success at the level of effective governance in other cases, as in Peru between 1992 and 2000 and in Viet Nam over the past 20 years.

Here, it is important to highlight the specific case of Peru. An analysis of the governance indicators for Peru produced by the World Bank<sup>9</sup> points out some very interesting trends (see figure 1). The scores for 'government effectiveness' and 'regulatory quality' were higher between 1996 and 2000 in comparison to the post-2000 period. This means that, according to a number of experts and several sources, this country had a more effective government and better regulatory quality when it was under a non-democratic regime. On the contrary, the score for 'voice and accountability' was higher for the post-2000 period in comparison to the period between 1996 and 2000. These findings seem to suggest that Peru has alternated between having either an effective government with a stronger regulatory quality or a more democratic government, but not both at the same time.

Peru's neighbours in Latin America have experienced a variety of challenges to democratic governance. States in the region have experienced some decline in their power as a consequence of globalization; at the same time, they also have undergone a set of radical reforms aimed at reducing their size and capacity to intervene in the economy and, consequently, in society. As a result, Latin American societies have experienced a somewhat forced process of economic integration into the world economy. This strong push towards economic integration has led to greater inequality and a significant decline in the State's capacity to offset these inequalities with safety nets and other public policies.<sup>10</sup> One of the most important tasks for several Latin American countries is to reinvigorate the State as redresser of social inequalities. It is worth noting that several Latin American countries (e.g. Andean and some Central American coun-

<sup>7</sup> Levi, M. (2006) 'Why We Need a New Theory of Government'. *Perspectives on Politics* 4(1): 5-19.



<sup>8</sup> It is worth noting here that, in most developing countries, social policies aimed at improving people's quality of life and developing human capacities through the provision of social services, the establishment of a security network for vulnerable people and improving the income of the poor have frequently been very weak.


<sup>9</sup> Kauffman, D. et al. (2008), op. cit.

<sup>10</sup> Faux, J. and L. Mishel (2000) 'Inequality and the Global Economy', in W. Hutton and A. Giddens (eds) *Global Capitalism*. New York: New Press.

tries) are confronting structural and historical conditions that make it particularly difficult to achieve significant progress towards the development of effective and democratic governance, including lack of civilian authority over the military and social and economic exclusion of indigenous populations.

**Figure 1. Worldwide Governance Indicators: Peru 1996-2007**



**Figure 1. Worldwide Governance Indicators: Peru 1996-2007 (continued)**

Source: Daniel Kauffman, Aart Kraay and Máximo Matruzzi (2008) *Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2007*. The World Bank Development Research, Group Macroeconomics and Growth Team & World Bank Institute, Global Governance Program

## 1.2 Governance Evidence and Indicators

Most evidence concerning governance is being produced predominantly by international organizations. Very frequently, these governance assessments are based on country scores on particular dimensions of governance (e.g. voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality of government, rule of law and control of corruption). This particular type of governance evidence is important because it provides comparisons of governance levels across different countries, and because it makes it possible to identify some governance trends over time (i.e. changes in governance). This in turn makes possible the identification of both successful and problematic country cases in terms of governance. In almost all cases, this type of governance evidence is subjective or grounded in perception-based data. In other words, it reflects the views of a diverse range of household and firm survey respondents, along with the opinions of experts from the private and public sectors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

In principle, there is nothing wrong with governance evidence that is based on perceptions. On the contrary, there are several reasons to make the case for this specific type of governance evidence.<sup>11</sup> Perceptions matter because agents base their actions on their own perceptions and views. Also, in many areas of governance, there are few alternatives to relying on subjective perceptions. And another reason to use perception-based evidence is that that some objective fact-based data do not capture existing reality; for example laws and regulations many not accurately reflect on real practices or informal institutions. Ultimately, all measures of governance rely on some kind of judgement.

There is cause for concern, however. The fact that most available governance evidence contains country scores, and that these scores mainly reflect perceptions or subjective assessments, can be an important limitation in assessing governance. This is particularly the case when we are interested in some key dimensions of governance, such as the capacity of gov-

<sup>11</sup> Kauffman, D. et al. (2008), op. cit.

ernments to implement public and social policies effectively, and in some key topics, such as governance reforms. Even some researchers working on developing cross-country governance indicators have recognized that they are sometimes too blunt to be useful tools for formulating specific governance reforms in particular country contexts. Moreover, they recognize a need for country-specific diagnostic data that can identify, for example, relevant constraints on governance in particular country circumstances; a different kind of data that is necessary to inform some governance reforms and the evaluation of their progress.<sup>12</sup>

There is a great need to develop different types of governance evidence for use in a complementary manner (e.g. subjective and objective) and to construct more detailed measures of governance for single countries, and most likely for specific public and social policies. It is critical to have more local assessment of a country's governance and to enhance the role of local research institutes and think tanks in producing governance evidence.<sup>13</sup>

## 2. PRODUCTION AND USE OF GOVERNANCE EVIDENCE IN PERU

### 2.1 Peru's Recent Political History

Peru is a poor nation with very modest levels of industrial development and formal employment. Most Peruvians make their living as underemployed urban workers or peasant workers. As with almost all Latin American countries, Peru experienced several military coups and democratic reversals during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. After a military dictatorship that lasted 12 years, Peru held democratic elections in 1980. The winner of that election, Fernando Belaúnde of *Acción Popular*, a conservative and right-wing party, defeated some more progressive parties. In the next election (1985), Alan García of the progressive *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA) was the winner. APRA also won a majority bloc in the legislature (the Senate and the House of Representatives). García and APRA won because they were perceived as offering a reformist and progressive alternative for the country.

Belaúnde and García both had a clear mandate to govern. Yet neither government ever proved successful in addressing Peru's acute economic crisis of the 1980s or the growing political violence unleashed mainly by the Shining Path guerrillas during the same decade. In retrospect, these dual failures by administrations of both the right and the left endangered Peru's democracy, shook public faith in the democratic system and ultimately contributed to the fall of democracy in Peru in 1992.

While Peru's economic crisis was repeated in many other Latin American nations at the time, the political violence and guerrilla terrorism during the 1980s and early 1990s was more unusual. The Shining Path, together with a lesser-known guerrilla movement, the *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru* (MRTA), challenged the democratic state and demanded a radical transformation of the liberal democratic political order. These groups used terrorism and violence in rural and urban areas to strike fear into the population, engender economic chaos, shake the foundations of the polity, and create a generalized atmosphere of instability and panic. Among citizens there was a willingness to resort to extreme measures to regain safety and stability. Although it is difficult to know for sure how many people died as a consequence of the terrorist actions and the counterinsurgency strategy carried out by the armed forces, the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission has calculated that the number of victims was higher than 60,000.

<sup>12</sup> Kauffman, D. et al. (2008), op. cit.

<sup>13</sup> United Nations Development Programme and Oslo Governance Centre (2007). *Governance Indicators: A User's Guide*. Second Edition.

As García's popularly elected government finished its term in 1990, Peru had reached a peak of economic crisis and political fear. Citizens had become disillusioned with the democratic government as a result of its apparent failings and its perceived contribution to the crises. After 10 years of democratic rule, the legitimacy of political parties was deeply discredited; citizens no longer had faith in the institutions of state, neither Congress nor the judiciary. This widespread popular dissatisfaction was a key reason for the electoral victory of Alberto Fujimori in 1990. Fujimori ran on a platform that deliberately spoke to these popular concerns. As a candidate, he discredited Peru's political parties and democratic institutions. He himself lacked a political party and instead ran on a personalistic ticket, based on a kind of social movement, *Cambio 90*. He used the charismatic appeal of his personality and made very vague general promises to solve the political crisis and stabilise the economy without using shock economic therapy. The electorate responded to his appeal and Fujimori was elected President in a second round with 62 percent of the vote. However, having rejected political parties in his campaign, and lacking a party of his own, Fujimori now had no political parties with which to work to initiate his much-touted reforms. This lack of legislative support rendered him weak and made it difficult, if not impossible, for him to pass laws with congressional support.

Although he had promised that his government would be different, Fujimori moved to implement the same economic package that had been advocated by the rightist, neo-liberal party, *Frente Democrático* (FREDEMO). In spite of his lack of domestic support, Fujimori's programme received strong backing from the international financial community and from key countries like the United States and Japan. These neo-liberal economic reforms took effect and Fujimori began to see some economic success. He ended hyperinflation and stabilised the economy. He then moved swiftly to use economic success for his own political goals.

In April 1992, with considerable domestic and international support, Fujimori dissolved the Congress that had been elected with him and suspended the 1979 Constitution. Fujimori justified the closure of Congress by saying that the legislators were blocking passage of urgent reformist measures. In particular, speed was necessary to combat terrorism. A large majority of Peruvians were convinced by this rhetoric. Soon after, Fujimori scored several key successes in the battle against terrorism. The most notable was the September 1992 capture in Lima of Abimael Guzmán and several other key Shining Path leaders. These victories produced a feeling of relief among Peruvians and an even greater level of popularity for Fujimori.

This popularity continued through the first half of the 1990s and produced Fujimori's second overwhelming presidential victory in 1995. In contrast with the failures and inefficiency of the two previous democratic governments, Peruvians saw Fujimori as having delivered on his promises to solve the economic crisis and decrease terrorism. Citizens were considerably less concerned about his anti-democratic behaviour and measures. He had delivered on his promises and this seemed to be all that mattered. Fujimori still retained significant popular support in a fraudulent election in 2000.

Fujimori was successful in economic and terrorist policy, but his political success was closely linked with his ability to bend and destroy democratic rules, procedures and institutions. The outcome of his systematic destruction of Peru's democratic institutions was an increasingly authoritarian presidency, unchecked by any independent powers, and the rise of electoral authoritarianism in Peru.<sup>14</sup> Unfortunately, the Peruvian population was willing to look the other way with respect to such democratic violations as long as the Fujimori government appeared effective.

As Fujimori turned his attention towards more normal governance questions, his government continued to violate the rules of democratic procedures and process. In the ongoing effort to oppress dissent and increase government power, Fujimori created a KGB-style political institu-

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<sup>14</sup> Carrión, J. (ed.) (2006) *The Fujimori Legacy: The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru*. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.

tion, the National Intelligence Service (SIN), headed by Vladimiro Montesinos. SIN engaged in systematic bribery and human rights violations. Objection to Fujimori's non-democratic behaviour increased at beginning of his third term in office, after the fraudulent elections of 2000, coming from an important part of the Peruvian population, the national Congress and the international community. A turning point in popular opinion came with the release of a video that showed Montesinos passing a bribe to a popularly elected legislator from an opposition party. A huge domestic and international scandal ensued in the following days when the level of government corruption and control of judges, the military, the police, politicians, journalists and even businessman became evident. Fujimori fled the country to avoid facing the justice system and resigned the presidency. Peru then began a process of democratic transition, led by Congress, which culminated in a new general election in 2001 and the restoration of democratic rule.

## 2.2 Mapping Local Production of Governance Evidence and its Use in Peru

The production of governance evidence in Peru at this moment is limited, scattered, uneven and sporadic. Probably the two most important reasons for this are the lack of an empirical research tradition among social and political scientists and in the practitioner community, and the lack of resources available for use in research and data collection. Accordingly, rather than working on the development of governance evidence and indicators, several Peruvian scholars dealing with governance have been concerned mainly with two areas: (a) identifying the 'knots' that tie up governance in the country such as the lack of an institutionalized party system, lack of an active civil society, lack of free media and lack of effective social policies that can alleviate poverty, as well as the need for State reform and decentralization;<sup>15</sup> and (b) developing a list of topics and policies that future governments should consider in order to consolidate Peruvian democracy and citizens' rights and improve the population's quality of life, making evident the economic and political costs of inclusive public policies.<sup>16</sup> The emphasis of scholarly research has been on the reform of the Peruvian State and a reorientation of public policy, particularly social policy, following the goals of equity, transparency and effectiveness. It has also provided some suggestions on how to start. In other words, most of the discussion and study of governance by local individuals and institutions has not yet moved in an empirical direction.

The next section of this paper contrasts evidence produced by local research institutes and think tanks with that produced by international institutions. The aim is to gain a better idea of the main features of the limited local production of governance evidence. One of the most marked similarities between the domestic and international knowledge producers is that neither has a shared or common definition of governance. At both international and local levels, different actors are conducting research on governance, but not all of them are talking to each other.

Regarding some of the main differences, local production of governance evidence does not aim to provide aggregate indicators of governance. As a consequence, local debate and research on governance is not about abstract governance concepts or constructs (e.g. rule of law), and the authors of this paper do not find any systematic efforts to discuss and improve the operationalization of such complex phenomenon. At the local level there is nothing close to the kind of debate seen today among international actors producing worldwide governance indicators.<sup>17</sup> Challenges to methods for measuring governance evidence, attention to error measurements and the difference between poor and wrong data, are simply absent among local scholars and practitioners assessing governance in Peru.

<sup>15</sup> Colectivo Ciudadanos por un Buen Gobierno (2005), op. cit.

<sup>16</sup> Tanaka, M. and R. Barrantes (2006) 'Aportes para la Gobernabilidad Democrática en el Perú. Los Desafíos Inmediatos', in United Nations Development Programme *La Democracia en Perú, Vol. 2, Proceso Histórico y Agenda Pendiente*. Lima: UNDP.

<sup>17</sup> Thomas, M. (2007) *What do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure?* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies.

The source of data is another difference between locally- and internationally-produced governance evidence. Most worldwide governance evidence comes from expert assessments and surveys of government officials, businesses and households (i.e. 'subjective' data). A large amount of governance evidence produced or analysed locally in Peru is based on official or administrative data. In this regard, the cases of education and health are a very good example because most governance evidence for these sectors is based on reports produced by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health. This means that most governance evidence produced by local think tanks and research institutes is based on 'objective' data. This makes possible an assessment of some governance dimensions that is not possible when using only 'subjective' evidence (e.g. the output of public and social policies). Indeed, the type of data that is being considered shapes the possibility to assess some specific governance dimensions.<sup>18</sup>

Regarding the actual production, dissemination and uptake of evidence in Peru to support governance, the next sections address some of the main efforts in four specific areas: (a) human rights; (b) corruption; (c) education as a social policy; and (d) government practices such as transparency.

### 2.3 Human Rights

Peru has a human rights civil society organization (CSO) that represents 67 local institutions: the *Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos*. The *Coordinadora* was created in 1985 by a group of human rights organizations interested mainly in clarifying the murder of nine Peruvian journalists in Uchuraccay, Ayacucho, on 26 January 1983. Currently, this organization has an integral approach towards human rights. This means that it is concerned not only with typical human rights cases (i.e. torture and forced disappearance) but also with a broad range of individual and collective human rights issues such as access to health and education. This integral approach is reflected in its institutional vision, which is to achieve the development of both individual and collective human rights in Peru and the development of public policies based on human rights. Its main goals are the consolidation of a human rights culture in Peru and the current democratic regime, mainly through the development of alliances and commitments with other local and international institutions. More specifically, this organization is committed to monitoring the human rights and legal situation, to lobbying for some laws or law reforms and to providing legal representation to victims of human rights abuses.

The development of governance indicators is not one of the *Coordinadora's* priorities. Accordingly, its annual report on the situation of human rights in Peru is mainly a qualitative assessment of the current status of some specific topics (e.g. the criminalization of social conflicts, the government's authoritarian tendencies, local and international human rights abuses trials, etc.). The empirical information included in this report is a list of the current legal situation of human rights abuse cases and a list of threats and aggression received by human rights activists, victims and witnesses.

There is no question that the *Coordinadora* is producing information and assessments that can be used as governance evidence, but it is also the case that, currently, this is not one of its main concerns or activities. As acknowledged by one of its officials,<sup>19</sup> the organization lies somewhere between a typical CSO and a judicial actor. The *Coordinadora* has played an active role in several human rights cases against the Peruvian State, representing victims in local and international courts. Very frequently, the *Coordinadora* does not have an easy relationship with the Peruvian State, which makes cooperation between these two actors difficult.

Individuals working at the *Coordinadora* recognize the importance of producing and collecting human rights information and evidence.<sup>20</sup> It is clear for them that some information and evi-

<sup>18</sup> United Nations Development Programme and Oslo Governance Centre (2007), op cit.

<sup>19</sup> Personal communication.

<sup>20</sup> Personal communication.

dence is key for monitoring and developing human rights in Peru, and that more robust evidence increases the chances of being effective in dealing with the government. However, these same individuals often do not have the required time, resources and expertise to produce and analyse this type of evidence.

## 2.4 Corruption

*Proética* is the first Peruvian NGO devoted exclusively to fighting corruption in the country. *Proética* was founded in 2001 by four CSOs interested in making visible the main causes and manifestations of corruption in Peru. In 2003, *Proética* was recognized as the Peruvian chapter of Transparency International. Its main goals are: (a) the development of anti-corruption awareness, which is critical for the development of citizen watchdog efforts against corruption; and (b) the prevention of corruption, mainly through monitoring practices of government institutions, private organizations, CSOs and citizens. *Proética* has produced a pioneering diagnostic of the corruption situation in Peru. According to this, Peru faces four main challenges: the weaknesses of government institutions in enforcing the rule of law; a generalized culture of secrecy; a lack of effective internal control mechanisms within government institutions; and a lack of citizen anti-corruption awareness.

In order to prevent corruption, the institution concentrates its efforts on developing public awareness, and on identifying, monitoring and measuring corruption practices, mainly in public institutions. *Proética* has conducted five national public opinion surveys (2001, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008) and held conferences to discuss the main findings of these surveys. In trying to prevent corrupt practices within public institutions, *Proética* has tried to promote transparency and access to public information, mainly within regional governments in Peru, and to support regional governments in the development and strengthening of mechanisms to fight and control corruption; it has also helped local CSOs develop an anti-corruption watchdog capacity. Likewise, *Proética* has been particularly active in conducting research on corruption to identify the main corruption risks and the conditions that allow for the development of corruption.

Considering the need for governance evidence about corruption in Peru, *Proética* has made a critical contribution in increasing anti-corruption awareness among the Peruvian population and providing key information regarding public perceptions on corruption and some corruption practices. Therefore, *Proética* is providing one of the key conditions for the development of anti-corruption policies: an increase in the level of corruption awareness and a good understanding of these phenomena.<sup>21</sup> However, it is also important to keep in mind that the implementation of effective anti-corruption policies also requires the participation of both government and non-government stakeholders, and the existence of a strong political will to prevent and fight corruption. In this regard, *Proética* could make a key contribution through the production of: (a) commitment governance indicators (i.e. whether public and non-public institutions have clear commitments to prevent and fight corruption); (b) process governance indicators (i.e. whether public and non-public institutions are indeed taking action to prevent and fight corruption); and (c) performance governance indicators (i.e. to what extent the actions to prevent and fight corruption made by different public and non-public institutions are having some impact).<sup>22</sup>

## 2.5 Education

The education policy debate in Peru in the past few years has been marked by a strong consensus regarding the need to develop participatory education policies, consolidate indicators about internal efficiency and change the management of the sector.<sup>23</sup> There is also an important consensus on the fact that specific policies and efforts recently implemented have not been effec-

<sup>21</sup> Transparency International (2006) 'Herramientas para Medir la Corrupción y la Gobernabilidad en Países Latinoamericanos'. Departamento de Políticas de Investigación de Transparency International.

<sup>22</sup> United Nations Development Programme and Oslo Governance Centre (2007), op cit.

<sup>23</sup> Cuenca, R. (2008) 'Balance de la Investigación en Educación 2004-2007', in Consorcio de Investigación Económica y Social *La Investigación Económica y Social en el Perú, 2004-2007*. Lima: CIES.

tive in solving the problems of quality and equity that characterize the sector. Information provided by the Ministry of Education has made it possible to confirm that the situation in the education sector in Peru is particularly critical. According to recent information,<sup>24</sup> only 12.1 percent of students who finish primary education in Peru are able to achieve the expected scores in reading comprehension. The situation is even worse for students completing secondary education, where only 9.8 percent achieve the expected scores. The situation is very similar in mathematics achievements. In all cases, students from the most disadvantaged socioeconomic levels have the lowest scores in both reading comprehension and mathematics.

In order to understand the specific role played by research institutes and think tanks dealing with education and education policy, it is important to acknowledge some trends that characterize their academic production. First, there has been an important increase in the number of education research projects in recent years. There were more than 80 different research efforts in education and/or education policy between 2004 and 2007.<sup>25</sup> Second, among all these efforts, most of the attention has been focused on certain topics: (a) student performance and determinants of learning and student achievement;<sup>26</sup> (b) the decentralization of the education sector and the role of a decentralized administration; and (c) policies on training teachers and the relationship between the State and the teachers' union (SUTEP). Third, most of these efforts have concluded by pointing out the need for future research rather than by making policy recommendations.

Therefore, it is not a surprise that scholars thinking about future research on education and the education sector have pointed out the need to advance previous research topics (e.g. determinants of learning, decentralization and the study of teachers as key actors in the education process) and to start new research inquiries on governance in the education sector. Particular mention has been made of the need to develop education governance indicators regarding the availability of resources for the sector, and indicators for levels of efficiency and transparency in the implementation of education policies.<sup>27</sup>

Finally, regarding the impact of education research, the extent to which education policymakers have been interested in such research is not known, nor is the extent to which they may have been able to incorporate all of this information and insights when designing and implementing education policies. There is a need to make a distinction between the political will of policy makers and their institutional capacity. It is possible that problems in improving the quality and equity of the education sector are not related to a lack of political will but rather to a lack of financial resources and institutional capacity.

## 2.6 Government Practices

With the return of democracy in 2001, monitoring government practices has become a recurrent activity of some Peruvian NGOs and CSOs. Frequently, the idea behind these activities is to encourage elected authorities to adopt good government practices following the concept of democratic governance (i.e. improving the efficiency of public administration, improving the quality of public services, improving the relationship between authorities and citizens, etc.) This section presents two organizations that are leaders in this field, the *Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana* and *Ciudadanos al Día*.

*Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana* is a consortium of NGOs that share the common goal of supporting the consolidation of the democratic regime in Peru by contributing to the elaboration of policy proposals for the reform of the State. In recent years, this organization has been concerned mainly with decentralization reform, which is seen as a unique opportunity to increase the level of citizen participation in government. As part of this concern, the organization has created a

<sup>24</sup> Cuenca (2008), op. cit.

<sup>25</sup> Cuenca (2008), op. cit.

<sup>26</sup> This topic has often been related to considerations of quality and equity in the education sector.

<sup>27</sup> Cuenca (2008), op. cit.

special project (*Participa Perú*) with a number of objectives: to provide information to citizens on the current process of decentralization and its legal initiatives; to open and consolidate channels and mechanisms of citizen participation at national, regional and local government levels; to support the creation and consolidation of mechanisms through which citizens will be able to know about the impact of decentralization policies and the performance of elected authorities; and to support the development of civil society opinions and initiatives regarding specific decentralization laws. *Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana* is working also to strengthen the administration and planning capabilities of regional governments under the assumption that this is key to improving the quality of public services and the level of transparency.

As part of this project, the organization has created a system of citizen watchdogs to monitor the current process of decentralization (*Vigila Perú*). The main goal of this system is to develop the capabilities of regional civil societies to analyse, monitor and participate in the process of decentralization. One of its specific goals is to change authorities' attitudes and behaviours in order to foster the development of a transparent and participative public administration. A very particular component of this initiative is the creation of periodic reports that contain indicators of key components of national, regional and local governments (e.g. quality of the regional budget execution, level of transparency of the regional public administration, quality of regional education and health systems, etc.).

Among all these components, *Vigila Perú* has been particularly active and successful in monitoring the extent to which regional governments are fulfilling the requirements of the recently promulgated Transparency and Access to Information Law. The main method used is a periodic assessment of the web pages of regional governments to see whether they contain the minimum required information about the public budget, public acquisitions, the agenda of the regional president, etc. The final outcome is a score that allows the measurement of the level of transparency of regional governments. One of its officials notes that, very frequently, regional governments are concerned about their transparency scores and rankings, and tend to implement recommendations made by *Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana*. In this regard, this seems to be a successful case of monitoring and improving government practices.

The second organization achieving some success in monitoring government practices is *Ciudadanos al Día*, another CSO concerned with the improvement of the quality of public administration. This organization operates in a different way. Its main strategy is to identify successful cases of government practice. These cases are defined as 'good government practices' because they specifically benefit citizens. *Ciudadanos al Día* uses its annual Good Government Practice Award to draw attention to a set of good government practices. The idea is to consider public offices as a whole and not individuals. Public recognition of these successful or good government practices is seen as an important step in making possible their replication in other public offices or institutions.

The methodology developed by *Ciudadanos al Día* to identify successful or good cases of government practice has been one of its main contributions.<sup>28</sup> This methodology is based on three steps: (a) the definition of problems in the functioning of the public administration; (b) the identification of all the initiatives taken to solve the problems; and (c) the generation of quantitative and qualitative indicators to assess the level of effectiveness of the initiatives taken. Another contribution has been the identification of 15 categories that can be used to identify good government practices and a set of attributes for each one of these categories. Categories include transparency and access to information, customer services in public offices, social inclusion, citizen participation, public-private cooperation, relationship with media, etc.

There is no doubt that *Ciudadanos al Día's* strategy is a very interesting way to promote the development of democratic governance. Nevertheless, it suffers from several shortcomings. First, the final improvement of the public administration or governance is based on the assump-

<sup>28</sup> Boza, B. (2007) 'Buenas Prácticas Gubernamentales'. Manual 2008.

tion that some or most of these good government practices will be replicated in other public offices. Therefore, it is critical to collect information about the willingness or the capacity of public offices to replicate these practices. Second, this strategy considers public offices in isolation. There is no way that this methodological strategy, as it is used right now, can be used to assess public sectors (i.e. a group of public offices), or to make comparisons across years, because there is no guarantee that the same public offices will be included in more than one year. Finally, in order to increase the impact of this type of effort, more systematic public and academic debate will be needed on the relevant categories of good government practice and its main attributes.

### 3. GOVERNANCE AND EDUCATION IN PERU 2004-2006

For several reasons, the analysis of the Peruvian education sector, and particularly the analysis of education policies for the period 2004-2006, is extremely relevant to a better understanding of the main prospects and challenges for the local production and use of governance evidence, and for the future prospects of evidence-based policy in developing countries. This particular period of time in recent Peruvian political history reveals some of the necessary conditions for the development of a cooperative relationship between research institutes and think tanks on the one hand, and between research institutes and the government on the other hand. Before addressing this particular case, the international debate on education governance is briefly discussed below.

#### 3.1 The International Debate on Governance and Education

There is currently consensus regarding the strong relationship between governance and education. It has specifically been stated, for example, that poor governance means that families and communities – especially those lacking financial resources – are on the receiving end of a system of education that is ineffective and of poor quality, does not respond to their needs and is also highly corrupt.<sup>29</sup> Along the same lines, it has been recognized that several of the visions and efforts to explain the phenomenon of governance produced in the past few years are particularly relevant to the issue of education and to those who consider education to be a right.

As an example of consensus, it is usually accepted that three out of the six components of governance that the World Bank considers<sup>30</sup> (voice and accountability, government effectiveness and control of corruption) have a direct influence on the right to education. It is also accepted that the indicators generated to measure these three components can also be used for or adapted to governance in the education sector. Likewise, it has been recognized that approaches that go beyond government performance when analysing the issue of governance are relevant to understanding the complex relationship between governance and education.<sup>31</sup> Evidence and indicators of governance should include not only the capacity of governments to implement their decisions and the results obtained but also the processes and necessary conditions to achieve good governance in education (i.e. that policies and public institutions respond to citizens' needs and rights, and that citizens and civil society have the capacity to fiscalise governments and authorities).<sup>32</sup>

The international debate on governance can make many contributions to the issue of education and education policies; however, there is still a great deal to be done before an appropriate

<sup>29</sup> United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (2008) *The Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2009. Overcoming Inequality: Why Governance Matters*. Paris: UNESCO.

<sup>30</sup> Kauffman, D. et al. (2008), op. cit.

<sup>31</sup> UNESCO (2008), op. cit. Chapter 3: Raising Quality and Strengthening Equity: Why Governance Matters.

<sup>32</sup> Department for International Development (2006) *Making Governance Work for the Poor*. London: DFID.

framework for analysis can be developed regarding the government of education or education governance. For example, there is still much to be done concerning the development of governance indicators directly related to education.<sup>33</sup> Significant changes have occurred in the past few years in the way of thinking about education governance. In the 1990s, the idea prevailed that governance of the education sector could be achieved by curtailing the power of the State and building a decision-making structure that was flatter or decentralized. This proposal sought to accomplish a number of objectives: transfer the central government's decision-making powers to schools and local governments through decentralization; give parents more power, either to enable them to choose the school they wanted to send their children to or so that they could be part of the administration of public schools; establish transparency measures against corruption, which are far easier to implement at a local level; and promote the participation of civil society in the implementation of education policies.<sup>34</sup>

In the past few years, this way of thinking about the governance of education has been strongly questioned, for several reasons.<sup>35</sup> First, some critics warn that a flat educational administration would entail the disappearance of the State as guarantor of the right to education. Second, the historical experience of western countries suggests that real and effective distribution of power, as well as the development of citizen and social rights, has occurred in the context of national coalitions that have been able to articulate the interests of the lower and middle classes. Third, in spite of the enormous enthusiasm with which neo-liberal policies were implemented in the management of education, there is very little evidence pointing to an improvement in the quality of education and the achievement of greater equity. This is the case both for countries that carried out a gradual and selective implementation of these types of policies and for those that carried out radical reforms (e.g. Chile, South Africa and Uganda).<sup>36</sup>

All of these recent developments have not yet led to the emergence of a new and exhaustive agenda regarding the government of education, or an important consensus on the concept of education governance. What is available at present is a series of recommendations that should guide the administration of education systems so that education can be a right for all. UNESCO has given a good summary of these recommendations for democratic governance.<sup>37</sup> These recommendations include, among others, the need to consider equity and poverty reduction policies; the formulation of policies containing clear goals; the development of political leadership; the need to consider education quality issues; and the need to increase national education budgets.

These recommendations are undoubtedly crucial for the development of systems of governance and educational administration that are participative and respond to citizens' needs. They particularly encourage people to think about a number of pressing issues: the need for equity policies that can reduce inequalities and intersectoral policies for the fight against poverty; the challenge of improving quality standards in education and reducing the disparity in educational achievements; the importance of civil society involvement, not only in the implementation of policies but also in the redistribution of power; the objective of increasing expenditure in education but with criteria of equity; the need to develop policies for teachers; and the fact that the role of the State in relation to the education system should not be only regulatory. Decisions will need to be made about indicators to evaluate the progress of government in terms of education, and this emerging framework will make such research discussions more complex. It will also encourage policy makers to seek evidence from civil society institutions.

<sup>33</sup> Crouch, L. and D. Winkler (2007). *Governance, Management and Financing Education for All: Basic Frameworks and Case Studies*. North Carolina: RTI International.

<sup>34</sup> UNESCO (2008), op. cit.

<sup>35</sup> Mundy, K. (2008) 'Civil Society and Its Role in the Achievement of "Education for All"', in UNESCO (2008), op. cit.

<sup>36</sup> Crouch, L. and D. Winkle (2007), op. cit.

<sup>37</sup> UNESCO (2008), op. cit.

Finally, an additional task will be to revise and analyse these principles and challenges according to the reality of each country. In Peru, the current context is marked by a recent process of democratic transition and the end of an authoritarian and highly corrupt regime, and by the need for reform of the State so that it can respond to the challenges of governance, social inclusion and economic competition.

### **3.2 The Case Study**

An analysis of the production and use of education governance evidence in Peru should include: (a) the role that civil society, particularly research institutes and think tanks, plays in the building of evidence and indicators on governance; and (b) the research, information and evidence that have been used to monitor governance in education, especially in relation to transparency, effectiveness and accountability of education policies and degree of civil society participation.

These topics will be analysed in the context of education governance in contemporary Peru. First, an analysis will be made of the education policies defined as priorities in the country in the 2001-2006 period and the extent to which they are connected to governance. These priorities were stated in the 2004-2006 education policy called the Social Pact of Reciprocal Commitments for Education, which was the outcome of a broad multiparty and civil society consensus. The premise is that this policy establishes a framework for education governance in Peru because it is a more democratic proposal as a reflection of State-civil society interaction during its design. Also, it is more effective in its search to establish four priorities, and it is more responsive because it sets out objective indicators and responsibilities that permit accountability for what has been done.

### **3.3 Democratic Transition and Education**

In September 2000, Fujimori fled the country when the network of political corruption created during his regime first came to light. With the aim of initiating an orderly transition, dialogue roundtables were created within the framework of the Organization of American States (OAS) and with the participation of political parties with parliamentary representation and the main CSOs in Peru. A political solution was found: a transitional government presided over by Valentín Paniagua and a call for elections for a new government and Congress, which would exercise its functions as of July 2001. Alejandro Toledo, one of the leaders of the opposition to the Fujimori regime, was elected President. He called together a National Agreement meeting to articulate State policies until 2002. These policies were approved in July 2002 and this forum for dialogue was institutionalized as the National Agreement Forum. The government, political parties and CSOs participated; 31 State policies were proposed, with Number 12 covering education. In a strict sense, this was a list of policy objectives rather than strategies for action.

In education, as in several other sectors, processes for consultation and citizen participation were established within the framework of the democratic transition. The transitional government initiated a national consultation on education, led by a group of 25 widely renowned experts who were representative of different sectors of civil society and the educational community. Participants recommended eight major changes in long-term education policies and also systematized the opinions expressed in consultations carried out throughout the country. The conclusions of this consultation were used by the National Agreement Forum in order to formulate State policy and to enact a new General Law on Education in 2003.

One of the conclusions of the consultation was the need to create an autonomous and independent body that would foster the formulation of long-term policies and the participation of civil society. The Toledo government followed this recommendation and in April 2003 created the National Council for Education. The objectives of this organization are to participate in the

formulation, agreement, follow-up and evaluation of the National Education Project, the medium and long-term education plans and policies and the intersectoral policies that contribute to the development of education.’ The Council promotes agreements and commitments in favour of the educational development of the country through the participation of the State and civil society. It has an official opinion on affairs concerning Peruvian education as a whole. It is made up of experts who are representative of national life and who are selected following according to criteria on ‘plurality and interdisciplinarity’ (Article 81 of the General Law on Education). The latter are appointed by the Ministry of Education for a six-year term, going beyond the five-year government period. The first group was appointed after informal consultations with the political parties, the teachers’ union and other important CSOs. As a result of these consultations, the National Council for Education, although not made up of representatives of institutions, possesses legitimacy. The National Council for Education may thus be likened to a think tank, although of a public nature.

### **3.4 Creation of Social Pact of Reciprocal Commitments for Education 2004-2006**

The Toledo government, elected for the period July 2001 and July 2006, started with significant challenges and a weak political base, as it did not have a parliamentary majority in Congress. It also had to face very important *de facto* powers: the network of corruption left by the previous government and questions about the armed forces involvement in human rights violations. The first three years of Toledo’s government were marked by significant political crises, which led to three cabinet reshuffles in three years. Between 2001 and 2004, there were four different ministries of education. All these changes were a direct consequence of bad management of the conflict between the teachers’ union in Peru (the largest union in the country) and the government.

Toledo’s government also came under fire when the results of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), organized by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), were published in July 2003. Peru came last in the assessment and half of the students did not even achieve Grade 1 on the assessment scale. This led the National Council for Education to propose that national education be declared in emergency. That is to say, extraordinary and urgent measures had to be implemented in order to start confronting the problems the international results had highlighted.

At the beginning of 2003, the Government went to the National Agreement Forum and agreed that this institution would formulate a set of policies for 2004-2006. This was done as part of the negotiations to avoid a parliamentary censure of the Merino cabinet. When the demise of the cabinet was imminent, the Minister of Education asked the National Council for Education to develop the Social Pact of Reciprocal Commitments, a policy proposal previously considered during the negotiations between the government and the teachers’ union. The name of the Pact referred to a new relationship between the State and teachers and was inspired by one of the policies of the National Agreement Forum: ‘The State... will foster the strengthening and reappraisal of teaching as a career, through a social pact that will lead to reciprocal commitments which will guarantee top quality professional education, promote the active training of teachers and ensure that suitable resources are provided for this end.’

The Council took advantage of this opportunity and decided to accept the proposal on the condition that it would be carried out within the framework of the National Agreement Forum. This was accepted and the Forum officially asked the Council to design the 2004-2006 education policies. The situation enabled this think tank to engage clearly in political action, as it had to start achieving agreements on its proposals with political parties and civil society. It no longer played only a technical role.

### 3.5 Actions and Objectives in the Social Pact of Reciprocal Commitments for Education

The policy proposed four main lines of action, with specific objectives that had technical support:

1. Foster a *national movement* in favour of quality learning, giving priority to language and communication, values and mathematical reasoning. This should receive the commitment of all the schools, the Ministry of Education, social organizations and the general public. Directed at improving the quality of education, the principal objective was: 'By 2006 average performance will have increased in writing and reading comprehension as well as in mathematical reasoning, in the tests carried out by the Ministry of Education at State and private schools, dramatically decreasing the percentage which in 2001 was below the basic level and increasing the percentage of those who are above the required level.' Those responsible included the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Education in coordination with regional and municipal governments, other ministries, family and social organizations, education networks, teachers at private and State schools and teaching organizations.
2. For the *professional development for teachers*, it was recommended that a proposal be agreed on and established for a new Law on the Public Teaching Career and a salary policy be implemented combining teachers' rights to fair pay and treatment with students' rights to teachers who are trained and committed to their learning. Teachers should commit themselves to improving their attendance and increasing the number of hours they teach. Each teacher should draw up a personal plan for professional improvement, including evaluation, and should improve and innovate classroom practices in order to receive incentives. The principal aims included presenting the Law on the Public Teaching Career before Congress in 2005 and increasing the minimum salary scale for three consecutive years. Those responsible were the Ministry of Education, with the participation of the National Council for Education, Congress and the National Agreement Forum for the Law on the Public Teaching Career; those responsible for teachers' salaries would be the National Agreement Forum, political parties, Congress, and the Ministries of Education and Economy and Finance.
3. In order to *finance education*, it was proposed that the needs of the sector be dealt with by guaranteeing an annual increase in the budget, in accordance with the National Agreement, and mechanisms of efficient use be put into place. The principal objectives were an increase of 560 million *soles* in 2004 and 0.2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2005 and 2006 to finance the emergency programme, the teachers' development strategy and the minimum needs of the sector. Those responsible were the National Agreement Forum, Congress, the Executive Branch, regional and municipal governments, teachers and teachers' unions.
4. Moralization<sup>38</sup> of the sector was another objective. The design and implementation of an *anti-corruption plan for education* would be agreed, and would by 2006 entail the exercise of effective citizen vigilance regarding acts of corruption in all areas of education, developing ethical performance in public duties and a commitment to results in education. The aim was that the Ministry of Education and at least half the regions would approve the plan in July 2004 and implement immediate measures to confront

<sup>38</sup> The word 'moralization' is used here as the English translation for *moralización*. This Spanish word is commonly used in Peru to describe a set of reforms aimed at improving the moral and ethical behaviour of public servants and authorities.

corruption. Those responsible were the Ministry of Education, regional governments and Congress.

## 4. IMPACT OF THE USE OF EVIDENCE ON THE FORMULATION OF THE SOCIAL PACT OF RECIPROCAL COMMITMENTS

This section presents an analysis of the type of evidence used for each of the four policies in the Social Pact of Reciprocal Commitments: (a) who designed it; (b) who used it; (c) how it contributed to ensuring governance in education; and (d) the current situation, starting from when the new government took office in July 2006.

### 4.1 National Movement for Learning Processes

- a) The principal primary source of information is the Quality Measurement Unit (QMU) at the Ministry of Education. This office has implemented and processed student performance assessments since 1966. The research institute *Grupo de Análisis para el Desarrollo* (GRADE) is the main centre in charge of analysing this information and produces different types of analyses concerning the factors that explain student performance or the differences in results, depending on what is being measured.
- b) During the 1990s, the information produced by the QMU was considered confidential. As a result, the government at the time did not permit the publication of Peru's poor results in the UNESCO assessment in 1996. It was only in 2001 that the transitional government agreed to publish these results, although these were little used by the Ministry of Education; that is to say, they did not influence the decisions made regarding policy. The information given by the QMU had an impact on public opinion — first the results of the PISA international assessment and later the national assessment in 2002. The National Council for Education used the results of these assessments to support the proposal on the movement for learning processes as well as to influence public opinion in favour of these proposals.
- c) The aim of the Pact to decrease the number of those below basic level and to increase the number of those above the required level was supported by QMU studies. With regard to education governance, this amounted to a turnabout in education policies, in that an objective was stated in terms of learning achievements rather than the traditional definitions in terms of access or education coverage. This was fundamental when it came to defining responsibilities in the sector and permitting accountability.
- d) The 2004-2006 measures were incorporated into the State education policies, the National Education Project to 2021 drawn up by the Toledo government, agreed in the National Agreement Forum and later approved by the current García government. At the start of its mandate, the new government assumed the aim of learning achievements for the period of government. In addition to this, the Ministry of Economy and Finance embarked on a reorganization of resources and decided to assign budgets according to results. However, the Ministry of Education policy has gradually been reduced to carrying out a national assessment of all the students in second grade primary, the results of which are given to the schools and parents but not published at national level, as had occurred until 2004. The other activities carried out by the ministry are not geared towards improving learning achievements among students.

## 4.2 Strategy for teachers' professional development

- a) In 2001, after receiving the conclusions of the Open Doors National Consultation, the Government set up a commission of experts to carry out a study on New Teaching in Peru, which was to lay the foundations for a renewed strategy for teachers' professional development. This commission drew up empirical information on the situation of teachers and carried out consultations and dialogues with the teachers' union. In addition to this, it organized a survey on perceptions of teachers and proposed a new Law on the Public Teaching Career to encourage merit. It worked on a broad reorganization of teacher training, which would make the initial training of teachers (offered by 400 institutions without any quality control) more efficient, and created a system of continual training. At civil society level, the NGO *Instituto de Pedagogía Popular* (IPP) monitors the situation of teachers and the teachers' union. It publishes studies on teacher conflict and a bi-monthly report on the teacher situation. The type of evidence that the IPP produces (e.g. on the evolution of teachers' salaries and the number of strikes every year) is very different from the evidence produced by the government (e.g. on numbers of teachers).
- b) This information was used by Congress when drawing up the General Law on Education and by the National Agreement Forum when it proposed State policies and formulated the concept of the Social Pact of Reciprocal Commitments. However, the Ministry of Education decided not to use the results during the period of two of its ministers. The inputs of the study on New Teaching as well as its policy proposals were again taken into account during the creation of the Pact. The participative nature of this study also enabled it to constitute a basis for dialogue with the teachers' union. In the 2001-2006 period, there were two parallel approaches to policy on teachers. On the one hand was the policy set forth in the General Law on Education, which aimed at changing the rules of the game with teachers; on the other hand, there was a line of action marked by a debate focusing strictly on salaries, as set out in the unfeasible promise of the President to double teachers' salaries during his term in office. The latter line of action led to two long teachers' strikes, the resignation of one minister of education and the establishment of a series of agreements with the teachers' union which, instead of aiming to change relations with the teachers, accentuated traditional ways of acting that would do nothing to bring about changes in the quality of education.
- c) The reform of the teachers' statute to centre it on good performance as a condition for progress or job permanence is considered an essential factor to achieving effectiveness in governing education. It was carried out by means of listening to the teachers, and led to a decrease in the conflict in the sector that had existed at the start of the Toledo government. The Social Pact of Reciprocal Commitments sought to 'de-salarise' policies regarding teachers and achieved a broad consensus to devise a new Law on the Public Teaching Career. It also proposed a salary policy for the last two years of government, which meant that work stoppages such as those that occurred in 2003 could be prevented. The Pact included other measures put forward in the study on New Teaching, such as the creation of a system of credits to be granted by teacher training institutions. This mechanism would ensure the regulation of teacher training systems. However, in terms of governance, the relationship between State, teachers and union goes beyond the sphere of government effectiveness: it poses the challenge of how to implement changes in democratic regimes when the interests of a body as important as teachers must be partially affected in order to achieve benefits for all students. The National Education Project to 2021 also includes the agreements reached in the Pact and sets them out in policies that cover a longer time-span.

- d) For the current government, policies regarding teachers have been a central component of their priorities. Nevertheless, there has been an important change of position, in that the government aimed at a strategy of confrontation with the teachers' union. There is widespread controversy in the country regarding the benefits of a policy towards teachers that, in addition to curtailing union action, has led to the whole body of teachers being discredited publicly. The government has implemented a series of actions that differ substantially from the technical proposals set out in New Teaching and that most experts consider to have little or no technical support. To a large extent, the New Teaching proposals have been largely ignored by the current government because this administration is interested in exerting or regaining its authority over teachers and the teachers' union. It seems that the current administration considers that weakening this union is necessary for the successful implementation of education policies. Nevertheless, the Government has passed the Law on the Public Teaching Career, which was part of the agreement of the Pact, and created the system of accreditation of higher education. Both measures need special technical implementations, but the Ministry of Education is doing nothing about this and the measures have lost legitimacy owing to the government's anti-teachers' union strategy. The union has also lost legitimacy in the public eye owing to the union's opposition to measures created during a process in which its views were taken into account. Other research centres have carried out research following the study on New Teaching and the approval of the Pact and monitoring by the IPP. For example, research centres such as the *Instituto de Estudios Peruanos* (IEP), associations such as *Foro Educativo*, and the National Council for Education itself have carried out research aimed at influencing education policies and started to create channels of dialogue with teachers and, in some cases, also with unions.

### 4.3 Financing of education

- a) In Peru, information on budget management is available to all citizens on the web page of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. This transparency obligation, which arose within the framework of the democratic transition, has meant that different sectors can analyse this information. Analysis during the period under study was primarily carried out by the National Council for Education and the Agreement on the Fight against Poverty, a public body that promotes agreement with respect to social policies. Both institutions compare their analyses with economists from research centres such as GRADE, *Universidad del Pacífico* and *Universidad Católica* in order to validate their rigour and soundness. For health, there is an observatory of budget management, promoted by the *Consortio de Investigación Económica*, whereas for education there is no office of this kind.
- b) The State policies approved in 2002 by the National Agreement Forum established a very clear indicator with regard to the budget allocation in education: each year, it should be increased by no less than 0.25 percent of GDP until it reaches 6 percent. During the period of the Pact, it was at 3 percent of GDP. The establishment of this indicator influenced public opinion. Analyses of the extent to which it was complied with, produced by the National Council for Education, were used widely by members of the National Agreement Forum. The Council carried out several public opinion campaigns in order to ensure that these budget increases were fulfilled and they achieved significant backing for the increases from citizens. An important issue regarding the use of this information is that the Ministry of Economy and Finance has established a mechanism to calculate the actual value of 0.25 percent, but the National Council for Education proposed a different formula. Eventually, the National Agreement Forum decided to use the Council's formula, which became the standard way of measuring the budget. In addition to policies to increase the budget, the National Education Project

to 2021 set up mechanisms for more effective allocation, depending on quality criteria, but also for redistribution, following policies of educational equity.

- c) The classic formulations on governance do not include budget issues as a central concern. In the 1990s, proposals regarding education focused on improving efficiency in spending but did not consider the need for a budget increase. In contrast, in Peru the budget has been a key governance issue, because it is considered an expression of the political will to implement changes in education. These proposals have progressed in terms of greater resources for education and they have contributed to setting criteria for the quality of expenditure. This coincides with the proposals on governance in the 2009 report on Education For All.
- d) Between 2001 and 2004, Peru had just begun to recover economically and there were restrictions on public spending. This was the principal argument of the Ministry of Economy and Finance for not complying with the budget increase established by the National Agreement Forum. Studies made by the National Council for Education and independent economists had shown the feasibility of these increases. From 2004, the economy had an annual growth rate of more than 5 percent and the tax burden increased significantly. This had a bearing on the education budget, which doubled in absolute terms over 2002-2008. However, education has never received more than 3.2 percent of GDP. Economic growth has therefore not led to these agreements being met. The current government, after two years of significant increases in education allocations, decided to reduce its allocations in the 2009 budget. There is also an important debate on the capacity for quality spending on the part of the education sector, which helps the Ministry of Economy and Finance justify its low investments. The National Council for Education has been the leader in following up on the education budget, seeking to create coalitions in Congress and civil society in order to increase education allocations. In many cases, the Ministry of Education itself has not had solvent technical proposals to help support these campaigns.

#### 4.4 Moralization of the Education Sector

- a) There is no evidence of this issue when the Social Pact of Reciprocal Commitments was created. Beyond empirical evidence, however, the public, teachers and education experts are convinced that there is widespread corruption in education. The only data supporting this lies in the fact that education is the sector against which most complaints have been lodged before the *Defensoría del Pueblo*, the Peruvian Ombudsman's Office. The Education Commission in Congress has started a study on the main indications of corruption in education and the factors that could explain them. The Ministry of Education, the Ombudsman's Office and the Office of the Comptroller General of the Republic also participate in the study. *Proética*, *Foro Educativo* and the *Universidad Antonio Ruiz de Montoya* participate as representatives of civil society.
- b) A process initiated in Congress led the Pact to assume moralization as a key issue. However, as can be seen in the formulation of the measure, this is less specific than in the other cases: to design an anti-corruption plan for education.
- c) Moralization is considered a central element in any framework on governance, but for education in Peru, it has still not been sufficiently specified and clarified.
- d) The Pact spurred interest in corruption in education. *Proética* decided to give priority to education and advised several regional governments in their design of anti-corruption plans. The Ombudsman's Office also decided to give priority to the sector in an analysis of corruption. There is also now some research on the issue, such as that produced by the IEP and *Foro Educativo*. However, this is an issue that generates

strong controversy. In Congress, there was a debate on the need for an anti-corruption law specifically for education; in the end, the law was not passed, based on the argument that corruption is not exclusive to the education sector and that therefore measures are required for the whole State. The Ministry of Education has also set up an office for complaints but to date it has not devised an anti-corruption plan.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

### 5.1 Case study conclusions<sup>39</sup>

#### 5.1.1 The Context

During the democratic transition in Peru, the main governance challenges for social and political actors lay in (1) investigating and dealing with the corruption and human rights abuses committed by the previous administration and (2) institutionalizing dialogue mechanisms between the State, political parties and civil society in order to formulate a common agenda for governance. The best expression of this second concern was the creation of the National Agreement Forum and the development of State policies within it. The Toledo government — elected at the end of this transition period — faced not only all these challenges but also a high level of political polarization and confrontation.

In the education sector, in a context defined by acute conflict between the government and the Peruvian teachers' union, education governance priorities led the government to rely on the contributions of civil society. This particular cooperative relationship between the State and civil society — using the National Council for Education as its space — made possible first the development of short-term education policies and later the formulation of a long-term plan (the National Education Plan to 2021). In terms of democratic governance, there is no doubt that this experience meant a higher level of citizen participation in the formulation of public policies. Education policies were jointly produced by government officials, representatives of the teachers' union and civil society experts. All of these policies were discussed under the assumption that education is a basic human right. In terms of governance, this experience highlights an interesting effort to make education policies more effective by clearly defining goals, responsibilities and indicators.

#### 5.1.2 The Evidence

In a relatively short time period, and in a clear context of crisis within the sector, the main government and non-government actors interested in facing the education governance challenges were forced to formulate an education plan and create institutionalized governance mechanisms. This explains why the most common practice regarding the use of evidence was to rely on existent data rather than generating new sources. The Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Economics and Finance and several research institutions were the main data providers. It is worth noting here that research institutions in Peru have made intensive and extensive use of the education data produced by the State in recent years.<sup>40</sup> This has had two main consequences. First, the chance for scholars to analyse State information on education has increased standards of data collection in public offices. Second, experts participating in the National Council for Education have been able to identify the main shortcomings of available State education data (e.g. issues with sampling and statistical inference).

<sup>39</sup> These conclusions follow the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) Research and Policy in Development (RAPID) framework: see ODI (nd) *The Rapid Framework for Assessing Research-Policy Links*. London: ODI.

<sup>40</sup> Key State-produced education data and evidence were not public during Fujimori's administration (e.g., UNESCO's Latin American Laboratory for Assessment of the Quality of Education (LLECE) project carried out in 1996).

Overall, their use of evidence has made it possible to give an empirical justification for several education policy proposals (e.g. the new education budget and teachers' policies). Furthermore, it seems that there is now an empirical (rather than solely value-driven) concern when discussing education policy in Peru. Finally, this experience also reveals that the National Council for Education was highly successful in communicating its proposals. In the end, most of its policy proposals were accepted by the Ministry of Education. However, as some specific policies show (e.g. teachers' policies), formal acceptance is not a guarantee that the government — particularly the next administration — will implement them.

### 5.1.3 The Links

Some of the particular features of the National Council for Education as a think tank explain how it maintains unusual and effective cooperative relationships between the government, political parties and civil society representatives. This cooperation made possible the formulation of an education policy for the period 2004-2006 and its approval by the National Agreement Forum. First, most of the members of the Council had a close relationship with policymakers in Peru. This enabled the NCE not only to have an influence on these policymakers but also to bring their perspectives to the table. Various members of the Council had close and trustworthy relationships with 10 out of 13 policy makers within the Forum. Members of the Council had close relationships with 18 out of 22 key civil society allies (e.g. newspapers, NGOs, international cooperation, etc.).

Second, the Council was able to create an image of independence and neutrality. Despite the fact that its members were appointed by the Minister for Education and two thirds of its resources came from public funds, the Council formulated public, independent and critical opinions of education policies. This behaviour created tensions between the Council and the five ministers within Toledo's administration. However, it also ensured the development of long-term relationships with several social and political actors as well as a significant level of public approval.

Third, the Council was not limited to analysis and judgements about proposed education policies. It was also committed to formulating policy proposals regarding the main problems of the education sector. The Council frequently tried to discuss its proposals with other social actors and justified them with the best available evidence. By the same token, most members of this organization were able to combine technical discourse with advocacy practice and very effective use of mass media.

To summarize, in the context of the recent democratic transition in Peru, the National Council for Education was a key actor in the definition of a medium-term education policy in Peru (i.e. the Social Pact of Reciprocal Commitments for Education 2004-2006).<sup>41</sup> This plan or policy contained new and very interesting features with regard to traditional education policies in the country. First, it included not only a 'course of action' but also goals, responsibilities and indicators. Second, it was policy based on empirical evidence. Third, its elaboration was not a matter of government officials only. It was elaborated in a forum with the participation of representatives of CSOs and political parties, under the leadership of the Council.

Allowing that a general framework for the relationship between education and governance is still under construction, recent experience in Peru can be seen as an interesting contribution, mainly in terms of the four specific policies that were prioritized. The national movement in favour of quality learning meant an important redefinition of the concept of effectiveness in education policy. Traditionally, effectiveness has been measured in terms of formal access to formal education, which is a very limited way of thinking about efficiency in education. Education pol-

<sup>41</sup> The National Council for Education is a *sui generis* think tank in Peru because it combines features of a typical CSO (i.e. it is composed of education experts who represent civil society) with features of a public institution (i.e. it is funded by the State and has specific legal obligations).

icy in Peru between 2004 and 2006 departed from this perspective, saying that quality of learning is as important as formal access. At the same time, the strategy for teachers' professional development aimed to address a critical factor in the education sector: the development of promotion and remuneration systems based on professional performance.

Regarding the financing of education policies, there were two main goals: (1) to make the case for the need to increase allocations to the education sector in the national budget (0.25 percent of GDP every year); and (2) to improve mechanisms for the efficient use of resources. What was important here was the conviction that improving the effectiveness of education policies in a country such as Peru needs not only more resources but also the most efficient use of them. Finally, with regard to the moralization of the education sector, education policy in Peru between 2004 and 2006 highlighted the role that the national judicial system needs to play and underlined the need to identify and deal with the numerous 'small' acts of corruption in the education sector. These small cases are often difficult to control but affect a vast number of students, teachers and parents.

Another interesting lesson from this experience is the conviction that the positive effect of all these specific education policies will be very limited unless consideration is given to the following persistent challenges in the country: (a) the reform of the State; (b) the level of citizen participation; and (c) the development of a set of inclusion and equity policies aimed at the most disadvantaged in the country. Regarding reform, it is clear that the current Peruvian State has several limitations that affect the effective implementation of social policies. Regarding citizen participation in the assessment of public policy, the current legal framework includes several mechanisms, but most of them have not been able to change the vertical relationship between government and citizens. Regarding the need for inclusion and equity policies, it is clear that this is not only a technical issue but also one of political will. On this topic, it is worth noting that, in its final report, the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission recommended profound reform of the education sector.<sup>42</sup> This was perceived necessary to provide better quality of education to the rural population, which suffered the most during the period of internal conflict. Unfortunately, this final report was published in August 2003 and therefore had limited impact on the formulation of the Social Pact of Reciprocal Commitments for Education.

Finally, regarding the production of evidence on education governance, Peru faces very particular issues. In the next few years, it is not likely that research institutes and think tanks in Peru will have enough resources to produce the evidence currently produced by the State. These institutes and think tanks depend heavily on international cooperation and this has been decreasing as Peru has moved to become a middle-income country. This means that CSOs will keep relying on State data and will always have to be alert about the manipulation of these data as well as quality issues regarding education governance evidence.

## 5.2 Conclusions on the Production and Use of Governance Evidence in Peru

The development of democratic governance in developing countries can be considered a critical factor for the improvement of citizens' quality of life and for the maintenance and consolidation of current representative regimes in this region.<sup>43</sup> Unfortunately, as the concept of governance is a complex one, there is not a clear consensus on its exact meaning. In the current debate, there are at least three different definitions: (a) governance as the framework and process of policymaking; (b) governance as the process of policy implementation; and (c) governance as policy outcomes. Despite these important differences, the concept of democratic governance is

<sup>42</sup> The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was created in 2001 to investigate the process of violence of political origin experienced in Peru between 1980 and 2000.

<sup>43</sup> Carrión, J. and P. Zárate (2009). *Cultura política de la democracia en el Perú, 2008: El impacto de la gobernabilidad*. Latin American Public Opinion Project.

extremely useful; it makes it possible to address some of the most important challenges regarding the achievement of more effective and representative governments. In the specific case of Peru there is a deficit of effective governance and a deficient quality of democracy (i.e. a highly uneven performance of democracy vis-à-vis specific individual rights and specific social groups). Therefore, there is no doubt that the development of democratic governance is critical in this country.

Given the difficulties in advancing democratic governance in developing and post-conflict countries such as Peru, it is clear that close attention must be paid to what governance evidence reveals about the main challenges, advancements and setbacks to democratic governance. Specifically, the analysis of governance evidence could enable the development of more informed and better policies. Regarding the current production of governance evidence, some particular features are worth noting. First, there is consensus on the importance of monitoring governance and producing governance evidence. As a consequence, several international organizations have been very active in recent years in producing and analysing indicators closely related to the concept of governance and/or democratic governance (e.g. the World Bank, Transparency International, Freedom House, etc.). These efforts produce annual scores for a large number of countries. This enables empirical evidence about governance trends and comparative analysis to be done across regions and countries. Often these research projects resemble what are known as 'large-N studies': they contain limitations. For example, there is no detailed and in-depth information about specific countries, and sometimes it is difficult to attain a good understanding of what is really happening in terms of governance and democratic governance within particular countries. In addition, most of the governance evidence collected by international organizations is not providing much information about some key dimensions of governance (e.g. impact of specific policies).

Information provided by these large-N studies on governance must be complemented by case studies and 'small-N studies'. This is exactly what local production of governance evidence can do (i.e. detailed and in-depth knowledge about a particular case and assessments of the impacts of specific policies and, in general, of government's commitments, resources and performance). In trying to better understand the local production and use of governance evidence, the authors of the present report have presented a first map of this situation in Peru. This report finds that the current production of governance evidence in Peru is scattered, uneven and, very frequently, unsystematic. Similarly, there is much to be done in terms of developing the capacities of local research institutes and think tanks to produce and collect governance evidence. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight some interesting features.

One interesting feature pertains to subjective and objective information. In contrast with most governance evidence produced by international organizations, local production and analysis of governance evidence presents an interesting mix of both 'subjective' (e.g. citizen perceptions about corruption) and 'objective' information (e.g. State data about learning achievements). This combination makes it possible to know not only what citizens are thinking about governance issues in their country but also what the current situation is in different sectors and to what extent specific policies are having or not having a positive impact. As a consequence of this, some research institutes and think tanks dealing with governance issues in Peru may be able to offer specific policy recommendations.

Another interesting feature about the production of governance evidence in Peru is that, very frequently, local research institutes and think tanks are generating basic or baseline information about social sectors that is currently absent in the country (e.g. education, health, etc.) In theory, this is the type of information that States are supposed to produce in order to be able to formulate and implement public policies. Unfortunately, this is not always the case in Peru.

Therefore, to a large extent, the research agenda of research institutes and think tanks is oriented towards generating the basic information that the Peruvian government is lacking.

Regarding the production and use of education governance evidence in Peru, an interesting contrast can be made with other sectors or topics. To a large extent this is the case because the Peruvian experience supports the contention that research production and utilization aimed at influencing policy-making depend on the nature of the policy sector.<sup>44</sup> Specifically, Jones et al. propose a set of variables that should be considered in order to examine research influence on policy-making in different sectors: (a) the level of technical expertise required to engage in the policy process in a particular sector, (b) the extent to which the policy issue is contested, (c) the strength of economic interests involved in the sector, and (d) the level of internalization of the policy issue under study.<sup>45</sup>

If the four policy sectors that have been considered here are compared, (i.e. human rights, corruption, government practices and a social policy such as education), it is possible to observe some very interesting trends.

Some government practices present the highest level of technical specificity, in terms of the level of technical complexity of the four policy sectors and the technical expertise needed to participate in these different policy processes. In contrast, human rights, corruption and education issues are not frequently a 'matter of experts'. Regarding the level of issue contestation, it is clear that human rights is the sector that faces the most difficult situation. In this regard, it is highly unlikely that governance evidence produced by CSOs or research institutes will be sufficient to change policy direction in this sector. By the same token, and under the current circumstances, there is almost no room for cooperation between the Peruvian State and CSOs in gathering and analyzing human rights evidence.

As expected, corruption and government practices are the areas where economic interests have the strongest influence. This is mainly the case because these sectors involve the type of macroeconomic policies that have the greatest economic impact. However, this does not mean that the education sector can be considered immune to economic actors and interests. Finally, regarding the level of internalization of policy issues, and taking into consideration the current trends in the international community, this report observes that these four sectors are far more than domestic issues where the government will have the strongest role in producing governance evidence and shaping policy. The development of a transnational advocacy network around the issue of human rights is probably the best example of this trend.

Therefore, the education sector in Peru has some clear advantages regarding the possibility of using research production for the development of evidence-based policy vis-à-vis the three other sectors considered here. First, it is probably the sector with the lowest level of political polarization. This means that the education sector in Peru has some interesting prospects in terms of policy dialogue and debate. Second, several of the topics included in the agenda for the education sector in Peru do not require a particularly high level of technical expertise. Therefore, as in the previous case, there are also some interesting prospects for the participation of different actors and stakeholders in the formulation, implementation and analysis of education policies. Third, without being immune to the influence of economic interests, the education sector faces fewer challenges in comparison to other sectors — including some other social policy sectors such as public health. Finally, if it is true that other issues (e.g. human rights and corruption) are attracting more international interest, it is also the case that there is a vibrant international community working on education and governance education.

As well as these more general or sector related reasons, there are also some other specific reasons that can explain the particular features of the production and use of education governance

<sup>44</sup> Jones, N., A. Pellini, J. Pomares and A. Datta. 2009. "Evidence-based Policy in a Post-conflict society Context: Assessing Improvements in Governance. A Synthesis Paper." Overseas Development Institute.

<sup>45</sup> Jones et al. (2008), op. cit.

evidence in Peru. First, research institutes and think tanks in Peru have been able to develop a close relationship with the Ministry of Education, especially during Toledo's government. The constant tension between governments and human rights CSOs shows that this is not always the case. The existence of this close relationship between authorities and experts and scholars is not a guarantee that the information and evidence produced by civil society will always be taken into consideration when formulating and implementing social policies, but at least it provides the possibility of cooperation. It is also the case that many Peruvian experts and scholars have been able to keep a reputation as sources of authoritative knowledge.

By the same token, analysis of education governance evidence and identification of useful indicators are facilitated by the existence of an important amount of data and information produced by the State. This is simply absent in other governance dimensions (e.g. corruption, transparency, etc.). Particularly for the education sector in Peru, it is almost impossible for research institutes and think tanks to have the necessary resources for the production of this type of evidence.

Another advantage of the production of education governance evidence is related to the existence of a community of researchers and experts working within a specific sector (i.e. the education sector) and dealing with very specific issues (i.e. determinants of the quality of learning). Again, compared to other experiences in Peru, in this situation there is nothing close to a common agenda (e.g. government practices). Among other things, this explains why the community of education experts has a higher interest in advancing the production of governance evidence and indicators.

Overall, it seems that better prospects for the generation and uptake of locally-produced governance evidence in Peru are in the realm of social policy. Nevertheless, it is critical to note that more, neutral and quality governance evidence in Peru is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for an improvement in democratic governance. The political will of the authorities and the capacity of the State are key factors for the successful and effective implementation of sound and evidence-based social policies. In this regard, it is critical for education research institutes and think tanks to make an extra effort to increase the participation of different stakeholders in policy debates.

Finally, if the local production of governance evidence in Peru has been defined as limited, scattered, uneven and sporadic; something very similar can be said about the use of both local and international governance evidence in the country. For example, very few CSOs in Peru are conducting analysis of international governance indicators (e.g. *Proética*) and few local scholars and practitioners adopt an empirical approach when dealing with governance issues. However, very frequently the problem it is not only the lack of interest expertise but the need to develop a cooperative relationship among government authorities, local research institutes, local think tanks and international organizations.